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PREFACE 
This paper is not intended to be a discourse on the law and 
practice relating to arbitrations. For that there are 
Statutes and textbooks available. Its purpose (consistent 
with its being prepared in an administrative law course) is 
rather to examine the process of arbitration from the point 
of view of autonomy and control. To that end the potential 
points of contact and conflict between the arbitral process 
and the ordinary courts have been examined. 
Why should arbitration be looked at from this point of 
view? Is not administrative law concerned with the exercise 
of public powers and duties, and control over these? True, 
there are distinctions clearly apparent between 
administrative and arbitral tribunals. The source of their 
authority - public and private; the nature of the issues 
submitted to them - public rights, duties, interests, 
compared with essentially lites inter part es; the coercive 
powers attaching to each. But on the other hand, they share 
common features. Both are deciding issues in a non-curial 
forum. The decisions in each case are binding. Both 
exercise delegated power. Both are preferred to courts 
because of their expertise, their flexibility and 
informality. In each basic standards of fairness are 
required. Finally, the courts - in some legal systems at 
least - are willing to treat them as inferior tribunals and 
thus subject to controlling judicial powers. The latter 
characteristic - or consequence of the other characteristics 
- is central to the paper. The basic questions are why and 
how do the courts exercise their control. What limits are 
there on the use of the supervisory powers? How do judges 
(and legislatures) treat the distinction between bodies set 
up by law and private bodies created by individuals? 
Arbitral procedure and law varies quite widely between 
different legal systems. The approach taken here is to 
focus on New Zealand law, a fairly typical common law 
system, and to which other Commonwealth systems are highly 
relevant. But for the purposes of comparison other domestic 
laws have been considered - especially American which, 
though founded on the common law, employ a contrasting 
approach to arbitration - and public international law. 
In this way it is hoped to cover in an adequate way both the 
general principles of the arbitral process and the detail of 
a particular system. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A. Arbitration and Adjudication 
Arbitration and adjudication resemble each other in 
that in each the decision maker's ruling is binding on the 
disputants. They are also alike in that each assumes a 
decision by a third party reached after a fair hearing and 
generally according to a pre-determined set of criteria. 
What distinguishes them is that in arbitration the reference 
to the decider is voluntary, whereas in ordinary 
adjudication a defendant must submit to the judicial process 
if it is lawfully1 invoked against him. It should be 
recognised, however, that in some instances the reality of 
the consent of the person submitting to arbitration is 
doubtful - as in cases of discrepancy of bargaining power. 
The law has developed special rules - both legislative and 
judge-made - to meet this fact, at least in part. 
A second difference between the two processes relates 
to the identity of the decider. In adjudication a hierarchy 
of forums is provided by the State, with a permanent staff 
of judges, in most cases appointed for the whole of their 
working lives, impeachable only with difficulty, and paid by 
the government. Litigants are not free to select, even from 
the limited panel, which judge is to decide their case, save 
to the extent that practical constraints on the organisation 
of the courts allow parties to pursue a limited strategy in 
the matter. Considerations of time, geography and 
occasionally expertise are relevant in this regard. 
1. The 1Bw protects certain people from some types of court proceedings: eg those with 
diplomatic immunity, Bnd those against ~Tiom substantially the sRme charge has previously 
been brought. 0. w UBRARY 
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This relative lack of freedom arises in part out of the 
governmental character of the ordinary judiciary, rather 
than solely any fears as to their independence. It is not 
necessary that deciders of disputes be chosen by independent 
persons in order that the deciders themselves will be 
impartial. The existence of arbitration itself bears 
witness to this. Independence and fairness in the arbitral 
process are, to the extent that they are required, assured 
by the parties' self-interest. They will be assumed to have 
agreed on an arbitrator whom they believe will be fair, 
because of his integrity, to their respective interests. This 
applies also where both parties appoint arbitrators who in 
turn designate a third arbitrator or an umpire. 
The choice of arbiter is a crucial part of the 
arbitration - since review of an arbitral decision is 
relatively restricted, it is vital that the arbitrator be 
accepted by both parties, and that his conduct of the 
procedure is fair. 
The procedure employed may itself be a distinguishing 
feature of arbitration compared with litigation. From the 
consensual basis of the proceedings flows the consequence 
that procedure is largely in the hands of the parties. This 
is consistent with some of the reasons for preferring 
arbitration in the first place, namely that the subject 
matter is more suited to a less formal procedure. The 
disputants can agree on what issues are to be resolved, 
which may in turn have an effect on the conduct of the 
arbitration. In theory it can range from a highly formal 
process, virtually indistinguishable from a judicial one, to 
an extremely simple operation, without a hearing, counsel, 
5 
or representations other than the bare details of the matter 
in contention. Arbitrations on the quality of goods are an 
example of the latter. This flexibility of procedure has 
implications for the relationship between ordinary courts and 
arbitral tribunals: the fewer and the less rigid are the 
norms of arbitral procedure, the narrower is the scope of the 
parties to complain about deviations and the greater the 
difficulty of proving them. 
It should be noted that the great freedom of choice 
available in the conduct of the arbitration does not rule 
out the use of a formal code agreed in advance. Many 
arbitration agreements incorporate the rules of established 
arbitration institutions as a matter of convenience. 
Moreover, some rules are implied by the law - either as 
supplementary or residual. 
B. Advantages of Arbitration 
Parties go to arbitration for different reasons. Its 
attraction is due in part to its inherent characteristics, as 
previously outlined. Another advantage lies in the privacy 
surrounding the proceedings. Disputants may favour a 
resolution of their differences in a court-like manner but 
without the concomitant publicity. Their motivations may be 
diverse, including the desire to present an efficient and 
untroubled image to the rest of the world, or the wish to 
avoid the leaking of information which may be of value to 
their competitors. An additional benefit obtained from 
separation from the courts is speed; in theory an 
arbitration may be set up and completed immediately the 
dispute arises - there is no need to await court fixtures, 
filing of pleadings, time for interrogatories and other 
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intermediate processes, and so on. Moreover, if the parties 
so agree, the delay in delivering the decision can be 
considerably reduced by dispensing with a reasoned judgment. 
However, in practice it is not always the case that 
advantage is taken of these opportunities to avoid wasting 
time. But the parties may be willing to forego such 
benefits in favour of some of the arbitration's other 
attractions. 
Another advantageous feature of arbitral decisions as 
opposed to judicial resolution is occasionally said to be 
the cheaper cost. It is unlikely that this claim is true in 
many instances today. Arbitrators have to be paid by the 
parties; a place for a hearing must be provided: in many 
cases the parties are represented by counsel. In addition 
international commercial arbitrations often involve travel: 
there may be three or more arbitrators, each of a different 
nationality. In less complex proceedings there may be a 
saving in costs, due to the more flexible nature of the 
process which can permit a much quicker hearing. 
In some cases the particular context of the dispute 
enjoins recourse to arbitration, not because of its inherent 
advantages but rather because adjudication is unavailable or 
unsuitable. This is evident in the case of differences 
between States and individuals who are citizens of foreign 
States. Thus if an oil company obtains a concession from a 
petroleum-producing country and disputes later arise from 
the arrangement, arbitration is an obvious contender for the 
choice of method to settle the matters. Adjudication in the 
national courts of the State will often be unacceptable to 
the company, for fear of political influence. 
the International Court is ruled 
Litigation in 
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out since only States may appear as litigants. 2 Recourse 
to the courts of the country where the company is 
incorporated (or of any other country) may be inefficacious 
because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, despite 
recent developments in that doctrine which curtail the 
3 immunities of States in some respects. Thus a non-curial 
method of resolution is necessary. The international 
community has recognised this need by providing 
institutional arbitration and conciliation facilities. 4 
Finally, an important feature of arbitration which 
often commends itself to parties seeking a speedy solution 
is finality. As a procedure constituted and conducted by 
private persons the rights of recourse normally available 
against judicial decisions are not invoked. The disputants 
can agree to establish an avenue of appeal or a more limited 
right, but the basic premise is that they will be bound by 
the decision of the arbitrator. 
C. Areas of Use 
Arbitration as a means of settling disputes is used in 
a variety of fields, ranging from the small and specfic area 
of quality arbitration (the "see and sniff" type) through 
major commercial disputes to the level of public 
international law, where the parties are States and the 
issues of great importance to millions. Interest in public 
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art.34. Such litigation is possible 
if the "parent" State enters the dispute on the company' s behalf. 
3. E.g. State Immunities Act 1978 (U.K.); For e i gn Sove r e ign Immunities Act 1976 (U.S.); 
I Congreso del Partido [1983) A. C. 244. 
4. E.g. Convention on the Settl ement of International Investment Disputes (known as 
I.C.S.I.D.): (1965) 4 I.L.M.532. 
8 
international arbitration increased markedly after the 
success of the Alabama Claims case, in which the United 
States and the United Kingdom governments arbitrated the 
question of the latter's breaches of neutrality in the 
American Civil War. The award and the British submission to 
judgment did much to enhance the reputation of compulsory 
settlement by a third party as a peaceful means of resolving 
international conflicts. The possibilities were developed 
at the peace conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, 
both of which adopted instruments calling on States to 
resort to arbitration in questions of a legal nature. 
Article 37 of the 1907 Convention states 
"International arbitration has for its object 
the settlement of disputes between States by 
judges of their own choice and on the basis 
of respect for law. 
Recourse to arbitration implies an 
engagement to submit in good faith to an award." 
The Hague Conventions moreover established the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, which in essence provides a panel of 
arbitrators suitable for parties to select for international 
disputes. The treaties also laid down a detailed procedure 
for the conduct of arbitration proceedings. 
Public international arbitration has not developed as 
fast in the period following the Second World War as it did 
in the first half of the centry. The creation of the 
International Court of Justice may have influenced this, 
although the use of adjudicative bodies proper in disputes 
between States has also been somewhat disappointing. Some 
see the diminution of both adjudication and arbitration at 
the global level as due to a greater blurring of the 
differences between political and legal disputes. 
Differences of law cannot always be separated from general 
9 
political tensions, nor can they necessarily be formulated 
5 
separately. Political disputes, it has come to be 
realised, are not truly susceptible of settlement in the 
detached legalistic fashion of international judicial or 
arbitral proceedings. 
But the models provided by public international law 
have influenced the use of arbitration in relations between 
private individuals of different States. The increase in 
arbitration of "transnational" commercial disputes is 
notable. The use of institutes such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of Arbitration has 
grown in response.
6 The arbitrators sponsored by these 
bodies are experts in maritime law and other fields. 
Transnational trade contracts are thus particularly suited 
to this type of arbitration by reason of both the neutrality 
and expertise of the judges. Contracts between States and 
aliens are also susceptible to arbitration. 
On a smaller scale, clauses providing for arbitration 
of disputes are found in many types of contract. The 
building trade and local body contracts present examples, as 
do leases of real property where arbitration is often 
stipulated to decide on rental values at the time of 
renewal. 
In these areas, varied though they may be, the 
differences between the parties often concern mixed 
5. See C. de Visscher "Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication" 
(1956) 50 A.J.I.L.467. 
6. See J.G. 1Wetter The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private (Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1979) Vol.4. 
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questions of fact, custom and law. As such, they are 
theoretically justiciable in ordinary courts; but the effort 
of proving complicated factual matters, including the 
adducing of expert evidence, presents great practical 
problems. Formerly a jury of businessmen of the City of 
London was used in some ordinary courts of law to overcome 
some of the difficulties; and today judges of the English 
Commercial Court are expert in these esoteric fields of law 
and custom. But obviously only some parties are able to 
avail themselves of such a facility. 
Some areas of activity, however, are not arbitrable. 
"Non-arbitrability" has two different meanings. First, it 
refers to fields in which, as a matter of positive law, 
arbitration is prohibited. In countries like New Zealand, 
matters which cannot be arbitrated are few, but they do 
exist. In New Zealand an Act of Parliament renders 
arbitration clauses in insurance policies unenforceable 
against the policy-holder. 7 The restriction is intended 
to avoid unfairness caused by inequality of bargaining 
power. In the United States securities disputes are 
generally not arbitrable,
8 for similar reasons. 
Secondly, "non-arbitrable" may refer to the innate 
unsuitability of particular types of disagreement for 
resolution by arbitration. In these cases settlement by 
court adjudication is a fortiori inappropriate. Lon Fuller 
cites as examples the division of a valuable art collection 
9 
and the positioning of players in a football team. 
7, Insurance LRw Reform Act 1979, s.8. 
8. Wilko v Swann 346 U,S.429 (1953). -- --
9, L.L.Fuller "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L.R. 353, 394-395. 
A less extreme example is industrial relations. The 
formalities of some processes in this area suggest that 
11 
arbitration is being employed. But labour arbitration can 
be seen as a different category to arbitration as discussed 
above. The issues being decided go more to what should be 
the position than to what is: the distinction is between 
disputes of interest and disputes of right. The criteria 
differ in each case, as does the role of the "arbitrators". 
A recent New Zealand case refers to the "broad and basic 
distinction between industrial arbitration and the 
determination of legal rights".
10 Industrial arbitration 
often resembles negotiation more than determination - just 
as some form of negotiation, such as mediation, would be 
necessary to divide the art collection. 
On the other hand, in some countries resort to 
interests arbitration is compulsory. 
that11 
It has been said 
"[A)lthough voluntary and compulsory arbitral 
institutions may appear ... to bear a superficial 
resemblance to each other, the two systems are 
totally divergent conceptually and philosophically." 
But it can be noted that disputes of right too are sometimes 
mandatorily referred to "arbitration."
12 This is a hybrid 
form because, although the dispute must be submitted, the 
choice of the arbitrator often remains with the parties, as 
does the regulation of the procedure. In the United States 
there are statutes providing for compulsory referral of 
10. N.Z.Drivers Association v N.Z. Road Carriers [1982) 1 N.Z.L.R.374, 391 
11. F. Raday Compulsory Interests Arbitration (Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, 1983) 11. 
12. See e.g. Government Life Insurance Act 1908, s.14(3); Waterfront Industry Act 1976, 
s.10(4). 
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ordinary civil disputes, in order to alleviate the workload 
of the courts. Although these obligatory references of 
legal disputes may be practically useful, even 
necessary, 13 it is questionable whether they can properly 
be described as arbitration at all. 
13, R. Broderick ''Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way'' (1983) 69 A.B.A.J. 64. 
II. 
A. 
THE COURTS' RELATIONSHIP WITH ARBITRATION. 
Basis of Judicial Intervention 
This issue goes to the very nature of the arbitral 
13 
process. The preceding part of the paper discussed the 
differences between the judicial and arbitral processes; the 
fundamental distinction is that arbitration is founded in 
contract. Consequently, the question arises as to the role 
of the courts in intervening in a process which is prima 
facie a relationship between the parties alone. The question 
is all the more important in that the very thing that the 
contract seeks to do is to shut out the courts' jurisdiction 
in the matters agreed to be submitted to arbitration. The 
parties might, had they wished, have provided for an appeal 
from the aribtrator to the courts. But such a right of 
appeal would be rare. Any right of appeal is generally to an 
appeal tribunal within the context of a trade association. 
The essence of the award is that it is final and binding, as 
both the legislature and the courts
15 have recognised. 
The source of the arbitrator's authority lies in the 
parties' contract. Without an agreement he cannot act, and 
he cannot act outside the terms of the contract. A judge, 
on the other hand, does not depend on the litigants before 
him for his powers, although they may withdraw their dispute 
f h
. 16 
rom im. The essential elements of the arbitration are 
imbued with consent: the decision to go to arbitration, the 
identity of the arbitrator (or at least of a means of 
15. Arbitration Act 1908, s.4 and sch.2; and A. Walton Russell on Arbitration (19 ed., 
Stevens, London, 1979 378 
16. Though in a recent criminal case the Court refused to let the appellant withdraw his 
appeal: Waymouth v Ministry of Transport [1982) 1 N.Z.L.R.358. 
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designating one), the issues to be submitted to him, the 
procedure to be adopted, the undertaking to be bound by the 
award. These considerations argue in favour of the courts 
restricting themselves from interfering in the process. If 
arbitration is seen as an autonomous institution, set up and 
regulated by individuals and not the State, it can be 
contended that the courts' jurisdiction does not extend to 
controlling it. Judges are sometimes disposed to accept 
this type of argument, even when the tribunal under scrutiny 
does not depend for its existence on the free consent of 
individuals, but rather on action by the State.
17 If the 
intention is that disputes be settled outside the ordinary 
judicial system, then that aim should be assisted. 
As might be expected, there are several countervailing 
arguments to the proposition that arbitration is a purely 
contractual creature and thus should be left untouched by 
the courts. The first relates to the law of contract itself 
and developes the theme that the parties do not intend to 
abdicate their legal rights in toto. In particular, when 
entering the arbitration contract, which may be but one 
clause in a complicated commercial document, they expect 
that any arbitration which may arise following a dispute 
will be conducted according to principles of fairness. 
These principles might be expressed in the arbitration 
agreement, or, more usually, assumed as a matter of 
course. But the precise content of the rules of fairness is 
less easy to assume. Presumably the parties, in choosing 
arbitration, have opted out of an elaborate procedure such 
as is found in court proceedings. A fortiori, it is 
difficult to justify intervention by State judges not for 
defects in procedure, but for errors in the award.
18 It 
is at least arguable that the parties agree to forego the 
safeguards provided by the ordinary courts related to 
15 
h . t 1 1 d · · 
19 
reac ing a correc ega ecision. Where speed, privacy 
and certainty as to obligations take a high priority it is 
reasonable to infer an agreement to abide by the 
arbitrator's decision, even if potentially erroneous.
20 
Another argument for judicial supervision of 
arbitration proceedings is that sometimes the consent of the 
parties is artificial. Concern has been expressed, 
particularly in the context of large commercial contracts 
where trade associations play an important part, that 
arbitration clauses have been foisted upon contracting 
parties through monopolistic power. If so then the very 
basis of the arbitration is undermined and the courts feel 
themselves justified on modern contractual principles to 
intervene. 
Arguments based on the law of contract are not the 
only basis for an activist judicial approach to 
arbitrations. 
intervention. 
Others emphasise the external character of 
These analyses see arbitration as just one 
system of dispute settlement which, like all other systems 
18. Lord Denning M.R. in Halfdan Grieg & Co. v Sterling Coal & Navigation Corp (The 
Lysland) [1973) Q.B, 843, 862, said "When the parties agree to arbitrate, it is, by our 
law, on the assumption that a point of law can •.• be referred to the courts". The 
reality of the assumption may be questionable, in some cases at least. 
19. See e.g. the arbitration clause in London Export Corporation Ltd. v Jubilee Coffee 
Roasting Co. Ltd. [1958) 1 W.L.R.271. 
?O. This need not have to be inferred since a finality clause will generally be express 
or implied (supra n.15), though such clauses are given limited efficacy by the courts. 
16 
potentially suited to supervision by courts, will in fact be 
subjected to control. Some types of disputes are 
acknowledged not to be amenable to ordinary judicial 
determination. Disputes of interest in the field of labour 
relations furnish an example. But since the arbitral 
process resembles in many instances the court process 
similar sorts of issues arise, involving a limited number of 
parties and covering reasonably well-defined ground - it is 
a suitable forum for the courts to supervise. 
This position is considerably strengthened by the 
argument that arbitration, and moreover the whole law of 
contract, are only possible in municipal systems because the 
law allows them: lex facit arbitrum
21 . Since the courts 
are a branch of the State and are entrusted with enforcing 
the law on its behalf they are entitled to see that all 
subordinate tribunals, whether based on statute or the law of 
contract, observe the law. The argument is perhaps 
particularised when it is recognised that the courts lend 
their support in enforcing arbitration proceedings, by 
nominating arbitrators in default of appointment, and by 
issuing subpoenas - and the execution of awards. The quid 
pro quo is that arbitrations and awards should conform to 
the standards laid down by the courts. 
This argument - the "jurisdictional theory"
22 
is 
also supported by regarding the function of adjudication as 
a sovereign one; that in fact the arbitrator's authority is 
21. F.A. Mann ,.Lex Facit Arbitrum" in P, Sanders (ed.) International Arbitration: L-iber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967) 157. 
22, See J. Lew Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1978) 52. 
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delegated from the State, albeit through the medium of the 
parties' agreement. Thus the State is justified in imposing 
certain conditions as to the exercise of the power. 
It should be noted that the jurisdictional theory does 
not fit the arbitral process in public international law, 
where the manifest lack of a sovereign reduces the source of 
the power of the arbitrator to the contracting parties 
themselves. Another feature is that it does not define the 
extent to which the court is entitled to intervene. The 
courts sometimes display an active approach and sometimes a 
self-denying one;
23 if the State is secure of its 
overriding powers it ought to be consistent by, for example, 
enacting a clear statement of the grounds for intervention 
in the arbitral process. 
It has been said that common law countries generally 
24 
reflect the jurisdictional theory: 
"The English ... writing and case law seem to adhere 
to [the jurisdictional theory) although it is 
difficult to be very positive in the matter, as the 
writers appear to take scant interest in the 
theoretical question of the juridical nature of 
private arbitration. Nevertheless one of the 
essential provisions of positive English law can only 
be explained~~ the jurisdictional theory of private 
arbitration." 
One particular justification for curial intervention, 
advanced and long established in English and other 
23. Compare Halfdan Grieg, supra n.18, with Exormisis v Oonsoo [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 432, 
434. 
24. G. Sauser-Hall "L'Arbitrage en Droit International Prive" (1952) 44-I Ann. inst. dr. 
int'l. 521 (translation). 
25. The reference is to the special case stated, infra. 
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Commonwealth courts, is the goal of uniformity of the 
law. 26 It is said that if the courts held their hand in 
relation to arbitrators' decisions the consequence would be 
awards based not on law but on the preference of the 
particular arbiter, unchecked by legal principles. Moreover 
this might lead to the fragmentation of commercial law in 
England which would be contrary to public policy. The 
particular concern for uniformity and certainty is viewed as 
of great importance, since the pre-eminence of English 
commercial law rests, it is claimed, on continuing guidance 
by the judges; many of its important features have been 
developed in cases stated by arbitrators. 27 It should be 
recognised that this argument, however well entrenched, 
derogates considerably from the autonomy of the parties and 
emphasises the common interest in individual disputes. An 
alternative attitude is found elsewhere. For example, in 
the State of New York, an important arbitration centre, the 
proceedings are viewed as essentially a private matter and 
not subject to close judicial scrutiny. 
Further, if arbitrators were at liberty to decide on 
the justice of the case, as they saw it, it is argued that 
the way would be open for powerful trade associations to 
dictate what should be the standards applied, and would lead 
to oppression of the commercially weak. Finally the 
approach is supported on the basis that the courts should be 
. '' h . 1 . . " 28 able to supervise any sp ere of nationa activity: as 
26. See Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922) 2 K.N.478, C.A. 
27. See Lord Diplock "The Case Stated - its Use and Abuse" (The Alexander Lecture, 1978) 
reproduced in J.G. Wetter, supra n.6, vol.4, 151. 
28. Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration (1978, Cmnd.7284). 
19 
Scrutton L.J. put it, "[t]here must be no Alsatia in England 
where the King's writ does not run 11 • 29 
A compromise theory defines the institution of 
arbitration as "sui generis, which has its origin in the 
agreement and draws its jurisdictional effects from the 
civil law 11 •
30 
Thus it is said to depend in part on the 
parties' will, in that they agree to go to arbitration, to 
the procedure to be applied (insofar as it does not conflict 
with mandatory laws of the place of arbiration), and to the 
time, place and arbitrator. But it also depends in part on 
the law of the place of arbitration (locus arbitri). 
Obligatory procedural rules must be follo~ed, as failure to 
do so will risk the denial of force to the award either by 
invalidation or refusal of enforcement. The law of the 
locus arbitri can decide what effect, if any, to give to the 
award. 
This theory has obvious attraction as a realistic 
description of the position, as well as having academic 
support.
31 
It seems clear that arbitration cannot be 
viewed as wholly contractual nor wholly "jurisdictional"; 
there are elements of both present. The more powers given 
by law to arbitrators and to courts supervising them, the 
less contractual the institution becomes, but the real 
question, it is submitted, is where the balance lies. 
Much of the foregoing discussion is weighted towards 
the power of judges to intervene in arbitrations in a 
negative way. But the relationship has another aspect 
29. Supra n.26, 488. (Alsatia was a sanctuary for crini nals in Whitefriars, L0ndon). 
30. G. Sauser-Hall (1957) 47-II Ann.inst.dr.int'l. 39$. (translation); and see supra 
n.24. 
31. E.g. C. Schmitthoff "The Jurisdiction of the Arbitr;;tcr" in Schmitthoff (ec.) 3 
International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana Publications, New York, 1980) Documents, Part 
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whereby courts can intervene to support the process, by 
providing coercive powers and expert advice. Sometimes the 
court is called on to nominate an arbitrator. These 
32 powers are more mechanical and excite less controversy 
than discretionary control of arbitral proceedings and 
awards, but they are nonetheless important. Because they 
are specified in the statute there is no doubt about their 
existence nor, generally, their scope; but the questions 
are raised as to what should be the division of powers as 
between the court and the arbitrator, who can invoke them, 
and whether they can be excluded by agreement. 
B. Qualifications on Intervention 
In administrative law, when it is desired to protect 
the proceedings or decisions of statutory bodies from review 
by the ordinary courts several devices are used. An obvious 
and direct way is to expressly preclude the court from 
taking jurisdiction, at least in relation to some aspects of 
the decision. Thus privative clauses and their attenuated 
variants purport to take away the remedies ordinarily 
available for irregular admistrative action; and sometimes 
oust even the court's right to entertain proceedings. 
Another more indirect way is to grant the original 
decision-maker a wide scope of authority. Sometimes the 
court will itself adopt a self-denying approach: the nature 
of the subject matter33 and the trivality of the 
tribunal's error are relevant factors in this regard. A 
discretionary remedy may also be influential. 
32. For an outline of the court's powers in New Zealand see Part III, infra. 
33. E.g. abortion legislation - see Wall v Livingston [1982) 1 N.Z.L.R.734. 
In the field of arbitration there is the important 
extra factor of the source of the tribunal's authority, 
namely, the parties' agreement. Arguably the existence 
of this feature alone should restrict the breadth of the 
21 
court's intervention. 
position in practice. 
However, as noted, that is not the 
But what if the disputants take the 
further step of specifically prohibiting the right of access 
to the courts? This would represent a sort of contractual 
privative clause: 
with protections. 
those who grant the power also hedge it 
The exclusion agreement would reconcile 
some of the opposing contentions in the contractual versus 
jurisdictional debate, since it would admit the validity of 
judicial powers while at the same time permitting the 
express contracting out of such powers. 
There are two questions: the first concerns 
preventing the court from taking original jurisdiction over 
the dispute, and the second is whether any rights to review 
can be exluded. As to the former the arbitration agreement 
itself implies the exclusion of primary jurisdiction; if 
the court hears the case the arbitration clause is rendered 
nugatory. This is dealt with further below.
34 
Exclusion of review powers is impermissible at common 
law, as exemplified in the decision of the English Court of 
Appeal in Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co.
35 
There a 
contract in standard form for the sale of sugar was 
expressed to be subject to the rules of the Refined Sugar 
Association, a trade body. The rules provided that any 
34. Part IV infra. 
35. Supra n. 26 . 
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disputes in sugar contracts were to be referred to 
arbitration, and further that the parties were not to apply 
to the High Court by way of case stated as permitted by the 
Arbitration Act. In this particular arbitration the buyers 
asked the arbitrator to state a special case but the request 
was refused in accordance with the rules of the Association. 
The buyers then applied to the Hight Court to have the 
award set aside for the misconduct of the arbitrators. In 
reply the sellers denied that there was any misconduct in 
view of the rule which indirectly formed part of the 
contract. The court found for the buyers and the sellers 
appealed. 
t 36 d. . d h 1 A strong cour 1sm1sse t e appea. The reasons, 
which have been mentioned in the preceding section, were 
essentially that the court's function in correcting errors 
of law by means on the special case stated was both 
entrenched and useful. Control would prevent abuse of the 
arbitration system by strong trade bodies while allowing for 
the enrichment of commercial law and the promotion of 
uniform legal principles. The rule that the court's 
ordinary jurisdiction must not be ousted was invoked and 
further: 37 
"The jurisdiction which is ousted in this case is not 
the common law jurisdiction of the Courts to give 
remedies for breaches of contract, but the special 
statutory jurisdiction of the Court to intervene to 
compel arbitrators to submit a point of law for 
determination by the Courts. This appears to me to be 
a provision of paramount importance in the interests 
of the public." 
36. Bankes, Scrutton and Atkin L.JJ. 
37. Supra n.26, 491 per Atkin L.J. 
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The principle adopted in the decision has since been 
affirmed by other courts and law reform bodies. 38 
In contrast, clauses which do not purport to oust the 
court's powers in toto but only to defer them until an award 
has been made are upheld. This is the effect of the House 
39 of Lords' decision in Scott v Avery. The House held 
that no cause of action arose under the contract until the 
arbitration had been completed. Further, in Atlantic 
40 
Shipping & Trading Co. v Louis Dreyfus & Co, where the 
agreement barred access to the court on account of a failure 
to begin the arbitration, it was decided that the court 
could not intervene. 
The cases cited suggest that direct exclusion of the 
court's jurisdiction is likely to meet strong resistance 
from judges; but if the parties only go so far as limiting 
rights of access the agreement may be better received. It 
seems that even a mildly controllable power is sufficiently 
acceptable to the court. 
A recent development in the English law of arbitration 
should be noted. By legislative intervention there has been 
created the right to contract out of judicial review in some 
circumstances. 41 Where the exclusion agreement is entered 
into after the dispute has arisen the court can not 
interfere. And in contracts involving a foreign party 
exclusion agreements are permitted, even if made before a 
38, Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v Belfort Maatschappii Voor Algemene 
Verzekgringeen [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 257; Re an Arbitration between Broughton and Ren0wn 
Collieries Ltd [1941] N.Z.L.R.277; Report of the Commercial Court Users Conference (1962, 
Cmnd.1616). 
39, (1856) 5 H.L.C.; 10 E.R.1121. But see Arbitration Amendment Act 1938 (~.Z.), 
s.5(4). 
40. [1922] 2 A.C. 250. But see 1938 Amendment (N.Z.), s.18(6). 
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disagreement arises. This is also allowed where the main 
contract is governed by foreign law. But the departure from 
the Czarnikow42 principle thus permitted does not apply to 
all the court's powers. Exclusion agreements are valid to 
prevent review of the award itself, of material points of 
law arising during the reference and of questions of fraud 
by the parties. They do not impede review of the 
arbitrator's conduct of the proceedings nor, probably, the 
issue of whether there is a valid arbitration agreement at 
all. Moreover the court's powers remain entrenched in 
certain types of commodity contract. 
A more fundamental restriction on intervention has 
arisen in the context of transnational arbitration. This is 
the phenomenon of "delocalisation" of the arbitral process, a 
concept which has been propounded in recent years by some 
writers as part of the internationalisation of commercial 
law. Delocalisation contemplates more than the autonomy of 
arbitration within a legal system; it envisages detachment 
of the process from any one system, at least until the 
enforcement of the award is sought. In particular, "the 
obligatory force of an arbitral award need not necessarily 
be derived from the law of the place where the award 
43 happened to be rendered". Thus the fact that a 
mandatory rule of procedure of the lex loci arbitri is 
42. Supra n.26. 
43. J. Paulsson "Delocalisation of International Co11UTiercial Arbitration: When and Why it 
Matters" (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q.53. For support of delocalisation see also Paulsson 
"Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin" (1981) 30 
I.C.L.Q.358. For criticism see Park "The Lex Loci Arbitri and International CollllTiercial 
Arbitration" (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q.25; F.A. Mann, supra n.21. The International Law 
Association is treating the argument seriously enough to consider an amending protocol to 
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: 
see (1983) 17 J.W.T.L.184. 
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infringed, which would prevent execution of the award in 
that country, is irrelevant to its enforcement in another 
State not possessing a similar rule. An even bolder 
extension of the concept entails the enforceability of the 
award even after it has been annulled in its country of 
origin, but as yet there are no examples of this. 
Another feature of delocalisation is that the courts 
of the locus arbitri should recognise the "international" 
character of transnational arbitration and consequently 
decline to scrutinise it as closely as they would a purely 
domestic arbitration. There are signs that this attitude is 
appearing. The English legislation of 1979 may be seen in 
this light, as "non-domestic" awards form one category 
eligible for exclusion of appeals. And the United States 
Supreme Court in Scherk v Alberto-Culver
44 distinguished an 
earlier decision that securities disputes were not arbitrable 
on the ground that the contract was international: 
"A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to 
enforce an international arbitration agreement would 
not only frustrate these purposes but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the 
parties ... The invalidation of such an agreement ... 
would, as well, reflect 'a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts'". 
The attempts to sever the arbitral process from the 
. h . . . 45 d ordinary legal system are not without t eir critics, an 
it seems obvious that the effect of an award must depend 
44. 417 U.S.506 (1974). 
45. See e.g. supra n.43; and Wetter, supra n.6, vol.2, 403. 
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ultimately on the attitude of the court in which execution 
is sought. But there is still scope for the judge to act 
with restraint, even in the fact of an award invalid in the 
country of origin, so long as it fulfils the conditions of 
validity in the place of execution. How important the 
development will prove is still speculative nevertheless. 
The character of the courts' relationship with 
arbitration is subject to three variable factors - time, 
means and grounds of intervention. 
the following sections. 
c. Timing 
These are considered in 
The nature of the interaction between the arbitral 
process and the courts is conditioned by, inter alia, the 
time when application to the court is made. First, there may 
be intervention at the initial moment of setting up an 
arbitration. The purpose might be to prevent it proceeding 
because of lack of authority or defects in the constitution 
of the tribunal; or to assist in the process by refusing to 
allow litigation to advance in the face of an arbitration 
clause governing the matter. The court might also support 
the establishment of an arbitral tribunal by appointing 
personnel. 
Secondly, faults in the proceeding of the hearing may 
call for remedy. Again the court's task may be either 
positive or negative. Where the arbitrator exceeds or 
misuses his powers or ignores his duties, or acts in breach 
of a procedural requirement the court can be called on to 
apply sanctions. In other cases the coercive powers 
possessed by State courts may be required to assist the 
progression of the arbitration by, for instance, summoning 
witnesses or ordering inspection of property. 
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In the third place, once the award has been given it 
might be attacked by the losing side on the basis that it 
embodies an erroneous decision. Or it may still at that 
point be challenged on the basis of irregularities at either 
of the earlier stages of the process. Further, the formal or 
technical consequences of the decision might be impugned; 
for example, orders for costs or interest. 
Lastly, the ultimate point of intersection with the 
judicial process, the enforcement of the award, will 
possibly become the scene of a final assault on the validity 
of the agreement, process or decision. 
Timing is also relevant in two other ways. The type 
of remedy sought will depend on when the application to the 
court is made. Thus if the challenger alleges that the 
arbitrator is biased by reason of interest, an application 
before he commences the hearing may enable him to be 
replaced, without impeaching the validity of the whole 
process. Moreover a request during the course of 
proceedings for directions can ensure that the arbitration 
is conducted on proper lines, thereby preventing the process 
going astray before it does so. If the goal desired is the 
quashing of the award or its remission to the arbitrator for 
reconsideration, the opportunity can only occur at the end 
of the proceedings. 
The second point is that the moment of the challenge 
to the arbitration will sometimes influence the attitude 
taken to it by the judge. He may be more willing, for 
instance, to order the substitution of a member of the 
tribunal early on than to vacate a delivered award in which 
the parties have invested time and money; and this may be a 
vital factor in the choice between setting aside and 
28 
D. Means 
In this regard there are again two opposing facets of 
the court's relationship with the arbitration, both 
supportive and controlling. Included among the former are 
methods of assisting the conduct of the hearing (which are 
better considered in a particular statutory context) . 46 
Methods of preventing the arbitration even commencing are 
also considered elsewhere. Means of controlling the 
arbitration and award will be discussed in this section. 
The court enforcement of the award shares the two 
characteristics in that it assists the arbitration to its 
ultimate conclusion but also provides a further opportunity 
to oppose implementation. 
It is important to note at the outset that the methods 
of recourse against an award are not confined to applying to 
the court. There are various possibilities of the arbitral 
tribunal itself acting to correct an irregularity which 
merit exploration. The existence of these powers is 
relevant to the approach a court will take. There are also 
practical advantages in being able to return to the original 
decider. The range of options depends on the nature of the 
complaint and the relief sought; possibilities included are 
rectification, interpretation and revision of the award. 
Questions are raised as to the power of the arbitrator to 
correct his decision and the basis on which he can do so. 
Some alleged errors are so fundamental as to 
necessitate a challenge before a different body. The 
methods here can also be subdivided according to the scope 
of the issues to be traversed and the extent of the court's 
46. Part III, infra. 
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power. Broadly there are two subcategories, appeal and 
review. A device peculiar to English-derived legal systems 
is the case stated which can be used either to consult the 
court during the arbitral proceedings or, in effect, to 
challenge an award on a point of law. 
An exceptional category of recourse can be noted: 
right to trial de novo in a court if either party is 
dissatisfied with the award. Examples of this are 
apparently limited to compulsory referrals to arbitration 
d . 47 un er American statutes. 
1. Rectification 
If through oversight or miscalculation there is a 
mistake in the award it is convenient that the arbitrator be 
able to correct it simply and speedily. But once he has 
delivered his award the arbiter is functus officio and not 
entitled to change it. In most legal systems exceptions to 
the principle exist to avoid needless inconvenience. For 
example section 8 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act reads: 
"The arbitrators or umpire acting under a submission 
may, unless the submission expresses a contrary 
intention, (c) correct in an award any clerical 
mistake or4grror arising from any accidental slip or omission." 
The courts have tended to read the section narrowly so 
that only an inadvertent mistake is corrigible by the 
arbitration. In Harrison v Bolton49 the arbitrators 
awarded a sum against the defendants. On receiving 
representations from the plaintiff they purported to amend 
47. Supra n.13 and text. 
48. In the Supplement to the 19th edition of Russell supra n.15, (notes to p.447) the 
editor states that the power given by this section is also in the court's inherent 
jurisdiction. 
49. [1975) 1 N.Z.L.R.457. 
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the award to increase the sum due. Under the award he 
plaintiff was entitled to half the amount realised by a 
certain transaction. The arbitrators mistook the sum 
realised and consequently awarded a lesser amount. They had 
made a second mistake based on incomplete evidence. 
It was held that section B(c) did not apply since "the 
arbitrators wrote down precisely what they meant to write 
down". In the first issue they misunderstood the facts; in 
the second fresh evidence became available; neither of 
these fell within the section. In the result, however, the 
judge exercised his power to remit the award; his power was 
more extensive than the arbitrators'. The section does not 
answer the question whether the arbitrator can act on his 
own initiative in correcting the award, even to the limited 
extent permissible. 
By contrast American statutes recognise more extensive 
powers of arbitrators to rectify awards. The federal 
Arbitration Act50 allows modification (on application) 
where there is an "evident material miscalculation ... or 
mistake in the description of any person, thing [etc]". It 
proceeds to permit modification where there has been an 
excess of jurisdiction in the sense of deciding a matter 
'd h b . . Sl M th t' d outsi et e su mission. oreover e correc ing or er 
is to "effect the intent [of the award] and promote justice 
between the parties". The New York law is to a similar 
effect, except it adds that where jurisdiction has been 
SO. 9 U.S.C. ss.1-14, s.11. 
51. Cf. Fedler v Hardy (1902) 18 T.L.R.591 where Channel J. refused to allow 
rectification under the equivalent of section 8(3) on the basis of excess of jurisdiction. 
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exceeded the modification may not affect the merits of the 
decision on the issues that were referred. Both American 
statutes impose time limits on applications for 
rectification. 
In public international law there are several examples 
of rectification clauses, limited in the main to clerical or 
'th . 1 52 ari metica errors . However it is at least arguable 
that the power to rectify is inherent in the arbitral 
tribunal in which case a specific treaty article would be 
unnecessary: 
"[T]here is authority for the proposition that an 
international tribunal has an inherent power to 
rectify an error apparent on the face of the award, at 
least up till the time of execution. Rectification in 
this sense does not involve so much a modification of 
the judgment or award as the expression of the true 
intention of the tribunal, and therefore does not 
conflict wis~ the principle that judgments and awards 
are final." 
There are problems however in determining the limits 
of a general power. Rectification should be confined to 
mistakes not touching the merits of the award; other 
procedures are available for more serious irregularities. 
The application of the basic principle presents 
difficulties. 
2. Interpretation 
If the award is ambiguous or otherwise unclear there 
is the possibility of requesting clarification from the 
tribunal. The New Zealand Act contains no provision for 
interpretation. The parties could make allowance for it in 
their agreement but in ad hoe arbitrations this would seem 
52. E.g. International Law Commission Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 1958; Wetter, 
supra n.6, vol.5, 240. These still have the status of lex ferenda. 
53. J.L. Simpson and H. Fox International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Stevens, 
London, 1959) 241. 
--
to be uncommon. Again interpretation does not breach the 
principle of res judicata because the parties are seeking 
only an elucidation of their rights, not to amend them. 
32 
Where there is an international element in the 
transaction the arbitration is more likely to be subject to 
the rules of an arbitration institution. Some of these make 
specific provision for interpretation of awards. Thus both 
54 55 the U.N.C.I.T.R.A.L. and I.C.S.I.D. rules allow 
interpretation within a limited time; the former deem any 
interpretation to be part of the award, thus acknowledging 
the res judicata point. The latter deal with an important 
practical problem in interpretation (and also in 
rectification), namely, the impermanence of the tribunal. 
It may be impossible to reconvene the same panel of 
arbitrators to interpret their award. In this event the 
administrative authority under the I.C.S.I.D. Convention may 
constitute a new tribunal. How satisfactory this solution 
will prove in all cases is doubtful, since the authors of 
the award are presumably those best qualified to interpret 
it. But the problem is unavoidable if the award is 
ambiguous and the arbitrator is not able to assist, either 
the parties must agree on its meaning or refer it to another 
authority. 56 The International Law Commission proposals 
provided that where it was impossible to resubmit the award 
it should be referred to the International Court. 
54. See Wetter, supra n.6, vol.4. These rules are incorporated in the London Court of 
Arbitration rules. 
55. Supra n.4. See Wetter, supra n.6, vol.4. 
56. Supra n.52, Art.33. 
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Public international law seems for the most part to 
accept that interpretation is only permissible where a prior 
agreement allows it, either an existing treaty or an ad hoe 
57 agreement after delivery of the award. There is however 
some support for the view that the interpretative power 
inheres in the tribunal. The United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal proceeded on this basis in one case, despite the 
lack of an interpretation clause in its statute. 58 
In domestic law, as noted, there is usually no 
specific power to interpret granted to the arbitrator. But 
the possibility exists of a court either declaring what the 
award means or remitting it for this purpose to the 
tribunal pursuant to the Arbitration Act. 
Under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 the High 
Court can make declaratory orders determining any question 
59 as to the construction or validity of an agreement. 
Whether "construction of the agreement'' includes an 
interpretation of the award is perhaps unclear; the award 
is the result of an agreement and may fairly be said to be 
imbued with consent since both parties have agreed to be 
bound by it. 60 
3. Revision 
Where the challenge to the award cannot properly be 
characterised as interpretation it may fall within a right 
of revision. This means of recourse is confined to 
situations where new facts arise; that is, facts which were 
not known to the tribunal or the applicant and which could 
57, See e.g. the award in the Euratom Tax Liability case (1966) 18 U.N.R.l.A.A.497, 514. 
58. Crawford v Sec. - Gen.of the U.N., quoted in W.N. Reisman Nullitv and Revision (Yale 
U.P. New Haven, 1971) 193. 
59, Sections 2 and 3. 
60. See I. 
• • 
• 
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not reasonably have been known. Generally the right depends 
on the new evidence being a decisive factor in the 
proceedings; errors of law are consequently unable to be 
corrected under this heading. 
The general principle of res judicata operates to bar 
revision unless the agreement permits it. Express provision 
for revision orginated in public international law. The 
first example is found in a general arbitration treaty 
61 
1898, and rights of revision were included in the Hague 
Conventions of the following year and 1907. The possibility 
of an implied right of revision was recognised by the 
Permant Court of International Justice 62 and exercised by 
two arbitral tribunals, in 1933 63 and 1941. 64 
Scope for revision is found in some domestic 
jurisdictions. Wetter cites65 the Zurich Procedural Code 
as affording the right and imposing restrictions on it. But 
in this case the request is made to a court, not the 
arbitrator . Similarly in common law jurisdictions there is 
generally no right in the arbitrator to revise an award on 
the basis of new facts, since his decision is final and 
binding. Any modification to the award must be sought 
through the court, by means of an application to remit. An 
agreement to give the arbitrator power to reconsider the 
award on the basis of new facts is probably valid, but he 
61. Italo - Agentine Pemanent Treaty of Arbitration, 186 C.T.S.378. 
62. Saint Naoum Monastery case [1924) P.C.I.J. Ser.B. No.9., pp.21-22. 
63. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v Germany (1933) 8. I.L.R.480, 484. 
64. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v Canada) (1941) 9 I.L.R. 315, 326. 
65. Supr.i n.6, vol.2, 495 (Art.293) 
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cannot reserve to himself the power to decide matters after 
d 1 . . h. d 1 . . . . d 66 e 1ver1ng 1s awar, un ess it 1s an 1nter1m awar . 
It will be seen that as a general rule arbitrators are 
powerless to modify their decisions, and court processes 
must be invoked. Where the arbiter does posses the relevant 
powers it is as a result of a statutory grant. Possibly the 
parties can supply the authority, but this may conflict with 
the demand of the courts that awards be final before 
execution will be ordered. In practice rights of 
modification do not seem to be given by the parties, unless 
indirectly by the incorporation of a set of institutional 
rules. The more important the power of alteration, the less 
likely it is to be granted at the outset, for reasons of 
finality. But where authority is granted its limits will be 
determined by the court. 
Powers of self-correction are, unsurprisingly , more 
common in public international law, because there is no 
central authority to perform the function: if such powers 
were not available one party might enjoy the unfair 
advantages stemming from an undoubted slip. Whether the 
authority must be expressly furnished by the parties or 
arises from the very nature of a tribunal is unclear. If 
the latter, it raises the interesting question in the 
domestic area of the relationship to the courts' powers to 
those of the tribunal. It is to the courts' principal 
methods of controlling the award that the discussion will 
now turn. 
4. Consultation 
Although at first sight a means of consulting the 
court connotes support rather than control, the special case 
36 
stated procedure as it has developed in many Commonwealth 
countries constitutes a major device for supervising arbitral 
awards. The method was developed in England during the 
nineteenth century by judges of Quarter Sessions, who would 
make findings of fact in the form of a special case and 
request the Queen's Bench to remit the case with its opinion 
67 on the law. The procedure was adopted for arbitrators by 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1954, and is now applicable also 
to many administrative tribunals. 68 
The special case procedure is strengthened by the 
right of a party to apply to the court to direct the 
arbitrator to state a case; and by the fact that refusal to 
allow the party an opportunity to make such an application 
constitutes "misconduct" for which the award can be set 
.d 69 asi e. Moreover the right to a case stated is 
70 entrenched. The device therefore represents a 
considerable limitation on the arbiter's freedom to decide 
questions of law finally. It will be seen later that this 
rationale influences the court in deciding whether a 
question of law should go to arbitration even initially. 
The courts view favourably the argument that legal issues 
should be decided by judges. It is relevant however to note 
that often eminent lawyers or retired judges (or even sitting 
71 judges in England ) are chosen to arbitrate questions of 
law. And apart from questions of qualification the court 
67. See Lord Diplock, supra n. 27, 152. 
68. Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, s.10. 
69. Re Fischel and Mann [1919] 2 K.B.431. 
70. Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co., supra n.26. 
71, Administratrion of Justice Act 1970 (U.K.) s.4. 
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will not review for error of law an award on a question of 
law specifically referred. 72 In this event the parties' 
preference prevails over the principle of suitability, but 
the cases demonstrate the difficulty of formulating a 
specific reference of a legal question. 
If the arbitrator refuses a party's request to state a 
case in what circumstances will the court compel him to do 
so? The section in the Act confers the bare power without 
any indication as to the manner of its exercise. In The 
73 Lysland the English Court of Appeal enunciated several 
principles: 
"The point of law should be real and substantial and 
such as to be open to serious argument and appropriate 
for decision by a court of law ... [It] should be 
clear cut and capable of being accurately stated as a 
point of law - as distinct from the dressing up of a 
matter of fact as if it were a point of law. [It] 
should be of such importance that the resolution of it 
is necessary for the proper determination of the 
case." 
If these requisites are fulfilled then the arbitrator 
should state a case; and if he declines the court will make 
him do so. The Lysland was a case of construction of a 
charter party. Kerr J. in the High Court had refused to 
direct a special case since he considered the question 
involved was well within the experience and ability of the 
arbitrator. He regarded the decision to order a case as 
discretionary, not as of right, and listed several factors to 
be taken into account. These are, with respect, preferable 
to Lord Denning's in the Court of Appeal because of their 
specificity. They include the qualifications of the 
72. F.R. Absalom v Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd [1933] A.C.592; Re 
an Arbitration, Roke and Stevens [1951] N.Z.L.R.375. 
73. Supra n.18. 
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arbitrator, the general importance of the point involved, 
the sum in contention, the consequences of delay caused by 
the special case procedure, and the likelihood of the 
74 arbitrator going wrong in law or in his procedure .. 
The broader criteria set out by the Court of Appeal 
did in fact produce a large number of applications for cases 
stated. It was said that parties to arbitrations 
apprehensive of the award going aginst them would request 
that a case be stated in order to delay enforcement of their 
bl . . 75 o igations; and despite Lord Denning's strictures 
against abuse of the method in The Lvsland the request would 
often be granted. For this reason among others the case 
stated procedure has now been replaced in England and some 
Commonwealth jurisdictions by a system of appeals from 
awards 76 (as to which see below) and determination of 
preliminary points of law. The latter resembles the former 
consultative case but is qualified by the necessity to 
obtain the leave of the court, which will be refused unless 
the resolution of the legal point might save the parties 
substantial costs and could substantially affect the rights 
f h 
. 77 o t e parties. 
74. Ibid. 851 
75. Report on Arbitration, supra n.28, para. 
76. Arbitration Act 1979 (U.K.); Arbitration Amendment Act 1980 (Sing.); Arbitration 
Ordinance 1980 (H.K.). 
77. Arbitration Act 1979 (U.K.) S.2(2). 
5. 
a. 
Appeal 
General 
Where the award (or proceedings) is attacked in a 
court of justice there are generally two possibilities, 
appeal and review. The distinction between them is 
reasonably well defined in common law systems; that is, 
they differ as to the source of the power, and as to what 
can be reviewed. In other systems only the latter 
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characteristic is important. In any system however appeal 
from an arbitral award is rare, for the obvious reason that 
awards are intended to be final both as to law and fact. 
"Appeal" implies a re-examination of the issues in the 
arbitration, and theoretically extends to both law and fact. 
However, most appellate bodies do not involve themselves in 
finding facts since that function is felt to be more 
appropriate to the court of first instance which sees all 
the witnesses and hears other evidence. Nevertheless 
inferences from primary facts found by a lower body are 
quite freely drawn, and the appellate court hearing a 
general appeal has power to depart from a finding of fact if 
it cannot see the justification for it. 
Appeal rights may be given by the parties, either to 
another privately created body (for example, an appeal board 
or executive committee of a trade association) or to a 
court. Secondly they may be granted by the legislature, as 
. . ·1 1 t . 78 in some c1v1 aw coun ries. The parties might be free 
to exclude the exercise of these rights by contract, or the 
appeal may be avoidable. 
78. See E.J. Cohn "Commercial Arbitration and the Rule 0f Law: A Comparative Guide" 
(1941) 4 U.T.L.J.1; and see n.76 supra. 
40 
In international law there have been only a few cases 
of appeal from arbitral proceedings to the International 
Court. There are however several examples to be found in 
the treaty series of appellate recourse to a court. Some of 
these are framed in a restricted manner (which perhaps 
qualifies them as review procedures) such as appeals as to 
jurisdiction. 79 But there are also more extensive rights 
including entitlement to a full appea1. 80 One such right 
was invoked in the Peter Pazmany University81 case decided 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933. 
That was an appeal from one ofthe Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
established after World War I to deal with claims arising 
between persons of different States from the reorganisation 
of territory after the war. The Hungarian University 
claimed ownership of land transferred to Czechoslavakia 
following the war. The Arbitral Commission found for the 
claimant and the Czech government appealed to the Permanent 
Court. The appeal was formulated in several ways, including 
arguments: that the Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdication; 
that its decision was a nullity; that its decision should be 
modified; and that the Tribunal had exercised its 
jurisdiction on wrong principles. The Permanent Court 
recognised its own jurisdiction as a court of appeal, but 
79. E.g. Art.15 of the Young Plan Treaty: 104 L.N.T.S. 243, 253, Art 31 of the Agreement 
on German External Debts (1953) 333 U.N. T.S.3. 
80. E.g. Treaty of Trianon (1930) 121 L.N.T.S.192, 
81. Peter Pazmany University v Czechoslovakia [1933] P.C.I.J. Ser A/B No. 61 
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felt it unnecessary to explore the problems associated with 
the question of the nature of its powers. It further 
declined to consider objections made by the Czech government 
relating to the procedure adopted before the Tribunal. They 
were not included in "questions of jurisdiction or 
merits 11 •
82 
The Court then dealt fully with 
Czechoslovakia's claims, embarking on a length review of the 
facts (including evidence not submitted to the Tribunal) 
after consulting the parties' written and oral submissions. 
Finally the Court decided against the Czech appeal, which 
finding "coincides with the operative clause of the judgment 
given by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 11 • 83 In a second 
case, decided in 1936, 84 the Permanent Court made a 
similar detailed examination of the facts and 
treaty provisions before deciding that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
These appeals from international arbitral awards are 
exceptional. The International Court of the inter-war 
period took a vigorous approach in reviewing the detail of 
the cases as part of its role to decide "questions of 
merits", but was careful not to take up issues which had not 
been submitted to it; and expressly not the task of 
supervising the conduct of the lower tribunal. 
82. Ibid, 17-18. 
83. Ibid, 44. 
84. Pajs, Czaky, Esterhazy Case [1936) P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B No.68 
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b. Recent Developments 
As already mentioned, several Commonwealth countries 
have adoptd a system of appeals on points of law from 
arbitral awards (and others may follow). This procedure is 
to be distinguished from rights of review because, though 
confined to legal questions, the appeal can decide on the 
merits of the award's handling of such questions. Review, on 
the other hand, typically denotes determining the validity of 
the award by considering whether the arbitrator exceeded his 
powers by making a vitiating error. 
The changes are underlain by a deeply entrenched 
attitude held by common law judges towards arbitrations. It 
is relevant to note that the changes were mooted by judges 
extrajudicially, 85 and developed further in a report 
recommending alterations, 86 and a Bill which eventually 
became the Arbitration Act 1979. In these preparations it 
was always stressed that the principles laid down in 
Czenikow v Roth Schmidt & Co. 87 were still valuable; but 
that circumstances had changed in the fifty years since that 
case. Thus the concept of judicial supervision of 
arbitrators which was necessary to ensure they complied with 
the law, and which had contributed greatly to the 
development of commercial law by the courts, should be 
preserved. The essential change was that it be cut down in 
extent. That is, recourse to the courts should still be 
allowed but through the filtering device of leave to appeal. 
85, By, for example, Lord Diplock, supra n.27, and Donaldson J,: see Russell on 
Arbitration, supra n.15 at viii. 
86. Supra n.28 
87. Supra n.26 
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The immediate reasons for the changes were two-fold: first, 
that the case stated procedure was being abused for the 
purposes of delaying the enforcement of obligations under 
the award. Secondly, it was felt that foreign governments 
were resisting the insertion of London arbitration clauses 
in large contracts to which they were parties, for the reason 
that English judicial review of awards was too extensive. 
This was estimated to be costing the British economy large 
sums in invisible earnings. An extra measure introduced for 
this particular purpose was a provision allowing parties to 
some types of contract to agree to exclude appeals on law 
from the award altogether. 88 Many parties nevertheless 
still cannot exclude the appeal unless they do so after the 
dispute arises. So, while recognising that important custom 
would be lost to English arbitrators if review was not cut 
back, the legislation seeks to preserve it in some of the 
commonest types of case submitted to arbitration in London, 
namely, maritime, insurance and commodity contracts, and all 
contracts involving only English parties. In each of these 
however, review can be ousted after the dispute has arisen, 
by consent. This last exception may well prove little-used, 
since it is likely that when a disagreement occurs at lest 
one party will assess his chances of success as smaller under 
the arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction. 
In sum, although the emphasis has been shifted back 
more to the freedom of arbitrators, this results from a 
quantitative approach rather than one based on autonomy 
88, Arbitration Act 1979 (U.K.), s.3: see Part II B supra. 
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inherent in arbitration itself. The mechanism 
for bringing the arbitration before the court is the 
granting of leave to appeal from the award. This is given 
1 h h . h 89 ~were t e Hig Court: 
" considers that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the determination of the question of 
law concerned could substantially affect the rights of 
one or more parties to the arbitration agreement; and 
the court may make any leave which it gives 
conditional upon the applicant complying with such 
conditions as it considers appropriate." 
This provision has already been considered in several 
important cases. In the first case to reach the House of 
Lords, Lord Diplock set out principles on which the 
discretion of the court to grant leave to appeal was to be 
applied. In this case, 90 The Nema, as charterparty on a 
standard form provided for the characters' use of the ship 
for seven consecutive voyages. A strike at a port prevented 
loading after the completion of one trip. The owners and 
charterers then added to the contract, permitting the owners 
to rehire the ship for one intermediate voyage while the 
strike continued. The charterparty was also extended for 
another seven voyages. At the end of the intermediate 
voyage the charterers wished the Nema to return but the 
owners relet her for another trip. The dispute went to 
arbitration, and the arbitrator found the whole contract to 
be fustrated. The charterers then sought leave to appeal. 
Robert Goff J. gave leave (and later allowed the appeal, 
varying the award). His decision was reversed by the Court 
of Appeal and the Law Lords confirmed the reversal. Their 
Lordships criticised the attitude of some High Court judges 
89. Ibid, s.1(4). 
90. Pioneer Shipping v B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd [1982] A.C.724. 
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who considered that if the criterion given in the section 
(namely, "substantially affects the rights of one or more 
parties") was met, leave should be given. This was a 
threshold requirement, held the Lords, and the court retained 
a discretion to refuse leave. Lord Diplock (with the 
agreement of all the other members of the House) developed a 
classification system for granting leave. It depended on 
whether the term of the contract in issue was standard form 
or a "one-off" clause. It further turned on the events 
surrounding the contract - whether they were "one-off" or 
likely to recur or, if the last-mentioned possibility was 
inapplicable, whether a court decision would be likely to add 
to the clarity and certainty of English law, and there was a 
strong prima facie case that the arbitrator was in error. 
The decision to grant leave or not, said his Lordship, should 
be taken on a bare reading of the award, and leave only given 
if the judge thought the arbitrator clearly wrong and if he 
(the judge) thought he could be persuaded that the arbitrator 
was right. Further, "wrong" meant that the arbitrator had 
misdirected himself in law or had come to a decision which no 
reasonable arbitrator could have come to. Several comments 
may be made in relation to these principles. First, most of 
Lord Diplock's speech was obiter, as seems to be recognised 
91 by the Court of Appeal. Secondly it is not necessarily 
possible to deal with an application for leave merely on a 
perusal of the award, because the procedure is by originating 
motion in open court. And the judge will almost always think 
91. ltalmare Shipping Co. v Ocean Tanker Co Inc. (The Rio Sun) (1982] 1 All E.R.517. 
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it is possible that he can be persuaded that he arbitrator is 
right. 92 Thirdly, is there always a clear difference 
between a one-off clause and a standard form contract? 93 
Moreoever the opinion of the Lords places an elaborate gloss 
on section 1(4) of the 1979 Act, which ex facie is straight 
forward. It is true that Lord Diplock spelled out from the 
scheme of the Act a legislative policy in favour of finality 
of awards. One indication, for example, was the further 
restriction on leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal which 
can only be granted in cases of questions of law of general 
bl . . 94 pu 1c importance; on the other hand this requirement is 
conspicuously absent from the High Court stage with which the 
Nema decision dealt. A policy of finality is consonant with 
the basic concept of arbitration; however the existence of a 
right of appeal on the substance of the legal aspects of the 
award is itself unimical to that basic idea. The way in 
which The Nema interprets the appeal right is perhaps both 
too restrictive and too selective in terms of the 
legislation. 
Later cases have characterised Lord Diplock's 
principles as guidelines only: "you can step over 
guidelines without causing any harm. You can move them, if 
need be, to suit the occasion 11 • 95 In The Emmanuel 
Colocotronis 96 the issue for arbitration was whether the 
parties were bound to arbitrate on the main contract. The 
92. B.V.S. S.A. v Kenna Shipping Co. S.A. (The Kennan) [1982) 1 All E.R.616. 
93. See Astro Valiente Compania Naviera S.A. v Pakistan Ministry of Fo0d and A~riculture 
(The Emmanuel Coloctronis) [1982] 1 All E.R.578, 581. And in A.R.A. v Codelfa [1981] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 300, 305 there was no evidence to distinguish the two. 
94. Arbitration Act 1979 (U.K.), s.1(7). 
95. The Rio Sun, supra n.91 per Lord Denning 
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latter was held to be in standard form, in which case The 
Nema indicated a strong prima facie case was necessary. The 
judge could not say that such a standard had been made out 
that the arbitrator was wrong, nor even a strong possibility 
but he granted leave anyway. There was a substantial 
question of law fairly arguable on both sides. The decision 
also possibly came within the "clarity and certainty of 
English law" bracket of Lord Diplock's dicta. And in Bulk 
Oil v Sun Internationa1 97 where again the arbitrator was 
not plainly in error nor could a strong case be established 
to that effect, Staughton J. agreed that in some 
circumstances The Nema could be departed from. In that case 
there was no standard form contract, but there might have 
been similar clauses in other oil agreements. Moreover the 
issues involved European Community law, which argued in 
favour of letting the courts deal with them. Leave to appeal 
was granted. 
In summary, the English legislation recognises 
explicitly what the courts had been permitting in effect, 
namely an appeal on a point of law from an arbitral award. 
The statute was founded in part on the perceived abuse of 
the previous sytem and partly in concern for the British 
economy. These may well be justifiable reasons for the 
reform, but it should be recognised that the basic principle 
of judicial control of arbitral awards is preserved, subject 
to the right of parties to certain types of parties to 
exclude it. The limits of the appeal are defined not by the 
seriousness of the irregularity alleged but by a filtering 
97. [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep.655, 
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device in the legislation. The need for leave to appeal, 
has been read by some judges are granting the courts a wide 
discretion which nevertheless is to be confined within 
judicially imposed bounds. But there is not full agreement 
over these limits, and other judges prefer to retain review 
over a wider class of cases (which admittedly seems 
consistent with the statute). The continuing litigation 
over the scope of the appeal will be valuable for 
legislatures in countries considering amendment of their 
arbitration laws on the United Kingdom model. 98 
6. Review 
Review denotes the consideration by a court of an 
award which is challenged for essential errors of law or 
procedure. It is thus more constrained than a right of 
appeal which can be as wide as the grantor decides. One 
special feature of review of importance in common law 
systems is that the historical source of the power was 
claimed by the courts, rather than depending on statute or 
the parties' contract. This is unremarkable in terms of 
English-derived administrative law, since the High Court 
exercises a centuries-old supervisory jurisdiction over 
inferior tribunals, originally confined to lower courts of 
law but extended to administrative tribunals. But a 
supervisory power over private bodies whose function is to 
settle disputes is less securely established. For example 
the power over inferior courts depends on the prerogative 
98. See the suggestions of Thorp J. in Kenneth Williams & Sons Ltd. v Martelli [1980] 2 
N.Z.L.R.596 and Chilwell J. in Re Wellington High School and Jeeves Construction Ltd. 
[1981] N.Z . Recent Law 88. 
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orders to control them; h d . d t . 99 sue or ers were sa1 o issue 
"(W]henever any body of persons having legal authority 
to determine questions affecting the rights of 
subjects .•. act in excess of their legal authority 
II 
"Legal authority" in this dictum refers only to 
statutory powers, not to contractual authority; thus the 
prerogative orders did not lie to arbitrators except in the 
t . 1 f 1 t t b" . 100 par 1cu ar case o compu sory s a utory ar 1trat1on. 
But the courts of common law claimed a power of review over 
101 arbitrators on legal questions from early last century, 
and had statutory powers to review for "corruption or undue 
means" even before them. 102 
Other legal systems also provide for review of 
arbitration proceedings. There the difference between 
review and appeal lies not in the source of the power 
(generally statutory) but rather in its scope. In all 
systems irregularities in the process or award susceptible 
to review must go to the very root of the decision, so that 
it can be said that there is no award. This principle, 
clear enough as a matter of theory, encounters difficulties 
in its application: what types of errors are so serious as 
to nullify the award, and how are they established? 
7. Enforcement 
The last potential point of intersection between the 
arbitral process and the courts is proceedings for the 
enforcement of the award. Plainly the parties can agree to 
execute the decision of the arbitrator themselves without 
99. ~ v Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205. 
100. ~ v National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians, Ex P. Neate [1953] 
1 Q.B. 704. And in relation to the statutory procedures in N.Z. see Kenneth Williams, 
supra n.98. 
101. Kent v Elstob [1802] 3 East 18; 102 E.R. 502. 
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the necessity of a court order, and ideally this would 
happen. They have, after all, voluntarily undertaken to do 
so by the fact of recourse to a decider whose award is to be 
"binding". If the award relates only to the obligations of 
each side and not to the manner of execution then an 
agreement, either as part of the original contract or ad hoe 
after delivery of the award, could be entered to deal with 
h . 1· . 103 t e practica ities. 
But where the losing party rejects the award the 
arbitrator has no power to force him to adhere to it. 
Theoretically if the arbitration agreement provided that the 
award granted proprietary rights on the lines of the 
arbiter's decision then the general law of property would 
permit some form of self-help. But an award per se does not 
operate in English and New Zealand law as a transfer of 
104 property. Thus in practice the legal authority of the 
State must be invoked to compel a recalcitrant loser to meet 
his obligations. 
Where, as in public international law, there is no 
fully effective central authority with coercive powers awards 
are ultimately unable to be enforced against a dissenting 
party. Some new agreement will be necessary to bring about 
the lawful and peaceful execution of the decision. A recent 
illustration is the arbitral proceedings between Argentina 
and Chile over disputed territory in the Beagle Channel. 
Argentina refused to accept the award, claiming it to be a 
11
. 105 nu ity. Since the limited right of appeal did not 
provide for this objection the Argentine government refused 
to submit to enforcement. 
103. E.g. in public international law, the Rann of Kutch case: see Wetter (1971) 65 
A.J.I.L.346. 
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Even if there had been a right of recourse the Argentinians 
might still have ignored the final decision for the reason 
that international law still lacks a comprehensive system of 
effective and legitimate enforcement measures. 
In municipal law (which also governs arbitrations 
between foreign parties, i.e., "transnational" arbitrations) 
mechanisms are provided to test the validity of an award, 
though to varying degrees in different systems. And once 
confirmed (if necessary) measures exist for executing the 
award. The two forms of involvement are linked in that the 
State may retain the right not to enforce if the State's 
standards of legal correctness are not met. 
E. Grounds 
The last of the variable factors relevant to the 
court-arbitration relationship is the reasons for which a 
court will interfere with the private proceedings. It is 
intended to deal with these later, principally in the 
context of control of awards, but the main grounds can be 
briefly considered here. 
An arbitrator's powers arise from contract, and now 
also from statute. He is not the source of his own 
authority. Thus where he acts outside the limits of his 
powers the courts - whether in a common law system or 
otherwise - will intervene. But ultra vires acts can arise 
in different shapes. For instance the arbitrator may have 
been disqualified from the outset; or he may purport to 
exercise a power he is not entitled to use. 
Fraud is a ground for upsetting an award. This is 
scarcely suprising since fraud has a vitiating effect in 
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many areas of the law. Even if arbitration was regarded as 
wholly contractual the presence of fraud would at least 
render the award voidable. Fraud in a judgement would go 
farther, even if the litigants were inclined to accept the 
result. 
Improper conduct not amounting to fraud may also be 
sufficient to invalidate the award. In English-derived 
arbitration statutes the concept of "misconduct" justifies 
intervention. But what is misconduct in a judge is not 
necessarily reprehensible in an arbitrator; again the 
problem lies chiefly in applying the principle. Moreoever 
the courts of common law countries decided early that the 
notion of misconduct can be expanded to include acts or 
omissions which carry with them no opprobrium but depart 
from standards of procedure. Other States have laws which 
expressly recognise procedural faults, especially if grave, 
as sufficient to overturn the award. 
Errors which do not fall into the preceding classes 
are in New Zealand law corrigible as part of an inherent 
jurisdiction. This applies especially to mistakes of law 
but factual errors are also sometimes reviewable. Other 
legal systems deny such powers over arbitration. It is not 
easy to see a clear difference between arbitration and 
adjudication where both sorts of mistake can be appealed to 
the courts. 
For the purposes of comparison it is interesting to 
consider the grounds for vacating awards under the United 
b . . A 106 Th States Ar itration et. ey are: 
(a) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud 
or undue means 
106 . Supra n.50. s.10. 
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(b) where there was evident partiality or corruption 
in the arbitrators ... 
(c) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct 
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by 
which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced. 
(d) where the arbitrators exceeded the powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final 
and definite award upon the subject matter was 
not made. 
A d th Y k 1 . l . 1 0 7 . . . l n e New or eg1s at1on is to a s1m1 ar 
effect with four exceptions. First, whereas a federal court 
"may" vacate the award on one of the above grounds, a New 
York judge "must" do so if a ground is made out. Second, 
the irregularity must have prejudiced the rights of a party. 
Third, in the place of paragraph (c) above the State law 
provides for invalidation for failure to observe the 
procedure set out in the statute, unless the irregularity 
was waived. Lastly, if a party had no notice of the 
arbitration he can upset the award on the basis that a valid 
agreement had not been made or complied with. 
So far as the grounds of review in New Zealand and 
cognate systems are concerned it is necessary to survey the 
case law. 
(a) 
108 One authority classifies them in five ways: 
where the award is bad on its face 
107. N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules 1963, Art.75, s.7511. 
108. Russell, supra n.15, 429 citing Montgomery, Jones & Co. v Liebenthal & Co. (1898) 78 
1.T.406. ow nsRiRr 
54 
(b) where there had been an admitted mistake and the 
arbitrator himself asks that the matter be 
remitted 
(c) where there haf 0~een misconduct on the part of the arbitrator 
(d) where fresh evidence has been discovered after 
the making of the award 
(e) where there is a possibility of an inadvertent 
injustice being done (although the validity of 
this ground is more arguable) 
109. Which may lead to a substantial miscarriage of justice (perhaps): see Wilson v 
Glover [1969] N.Z.L.R. 365; cf. Re Brien and Brien [1910] 2 I.R. 84, 89. 
III AN ARBITRATION STATUTE - COURT'S AND ARBITRATOR'S 
POWERS 
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A. The Abritration Act 1908 - Introduction 
The Arbitration Act is an old statute. It was first 
enacted in New Zealand in 1890, one year after the English 
Act on which it was modelled, as were most of the 
arbitration statutes passed by the then colonial 
Parliaments. The English Act of 1889 was mainly declaratory 
of earlier statutes and the common law, 110 which entails 
the continuing relevance of old case law. The history of 
the statute also explains some of its terminology which is 
antiquated and even obscure. Moreover the language is not 
always consistent as between the principal Act and its 
amendments. There are few of the latter: the only one of 
major significance in domestic arbitrations is that of 1938, 
itself based on an English amendment in 1934. While the 
English Act was consolidated and its language updated in 
1950, the New Zealand Act suffers from the piecemeal nature 
of both the original drafting and its legislative history. 
On the other hand the clear links between the Arbitration 
Acts of Commonwealth jurisdictions yield the benefits of 
cross-fertilisation. There have also been Acts dealing with 
the increasingly important subject of recognition and 
f f f . d 111 en orcement o ore1gn awar s. 
110. Russell, supra n.15, 3. 
111. Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) and the Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1933; 
Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act 1982: this Act is intended eventually to 
surersede the 1933 one, but unlike the latter is not deemed part of the principal Act. 
The Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1979 deals with the specialised 
subject of I.C.S.I.D. arbitrations. 
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The scope of the statute is not clearly set out. 
Essentially the provisions apply to a ''submission" which 
means: 
"a written agreement to submit present or future 
differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is 
named therein or not, or under which any question or 
matter is to be decided by one or more persons to be 
appointed by the contracting parties or by some person 
named in the agreement." 
Thus there must be an agreement in writing. A parol 
submission is therefore prima facie outside the scope of the 
statutory provisions. But on further examination this may 
not be the position. While many sections refer to 
"submissions" others purportedly apply generally or 
otherwise. For example section 11 states: "In all cases of 
reference to arbitration ... " Section 12 merely refers to 
"an arbitrator or umpire". The literal result is that a 
court can remit or set aside any award though the 
arbitration agreement was made orally, but it cannot 
summarily enforce such an award. 
. 112 . Some sections mention 
both "references" and "submissions". The intention seems to 
be to distinguish the contract allowing for arbitration from 
the particular case where the contract is invoked. 
not always clear in the context however whether the 
It is 
"reference" must be consequent on a submission. Another 
problem is the usage of the verbs "refer" and "submit" to 
denote the same thing. 113 The inconsistency may be 
explained by the history of the Act. 
112. E.g. principal Act, s.6; Amendment Act, ss.5-10. 
113. Cf. principal Act, s.2 and Amendment Act, ss.16-18. 
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In any event the use of "submission" is misleading 
since it masks two sorts of arbitration agreements. Other 
legal systems distinguish between a compromissory clause -
an agreement to submit future disputes - and a compromis - a 
contract to refer a dispute which has already arisen. In 
some countries - as in the common law - only the latter are 
enforceable. The definition of "submission" makes both 
lawful and subject to the Act. But a parol submission is 
governed by the common law
114 and cannot include future 
disagreements. Nor do oral arbitrations enjoy the benefit 
of those sections in the Act (including all the useful 
powers of the 1938 Amendment) which are not declaratory of 
the Common Law. 
A submission need not however be a formal document. 
So long as the agreement is evidenced by writing the Act 
will be invoked; an exchange of letters, for instance, will 
suffice. It is not necessary for the parties to sign the 
agreement. 
A feature of the definition unique to New Zealand is 
the second limb beginning after ''or not". This was inserted 
in 1906 115 in order to bring written agreements for 
valuation within the terms of the Act. Valuers and others 
who do not necessarily decide "differences" between parties 
were thus clothed with arbitrators' powers, and also 
b . h . f f . d 116 su Jected tote requirements o a air proce ure 
(although the latter is equally imposed by the common law) 
In other jurisdictions decisionmakers such as valuers will 
only be treated as arbitrators if the agreement so 
114. Re Davis and Brown's Arbitration (No. 2) [1957] V.R.127. 
115. Arbitration Act Amendment Act 1906, s.2. 
. 1· 117 imp 1es. A consequence of the New Zealand position is 
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that there need not, in terms of the Act, be a dispute; any 
"question or matter" can be referred. 
These issues relate to how to avail oneself of the 
statutory provisions. The converse question is, if there is 
a submission, can the Act be excluded? Some sections 
contain the clear formula, "unless the submission expresses 
a contrary intention". Arguably, therefore, all other 
provisions cannot be contracted out of. Th C . k 118 e zarn1 ow 
case furnishes a supporting example. But there are 
indications otherwise in some of the cases. For instance in 
Attorney-General v Offshore Mining Ltd119 although the 
contract fell within the definition of a submission it 
provided for the parties to agree separately to employ the 
statutory method of enforcement contained in section 13. 
They had not so agreed and the Court of Appeal held that 
they were not entitled to the benefit of the section. And 
in Re Wilson and Eastern Counties Navigation and Transport 
Co. 120 the Divisional Court held that the judge's power to 
appoint an arbitrator under the equivalent of section 6(b) 
was not exercisable where the submission provided to the 
contrary. On the other hand, in Hunt v Wilson120 a Cooke J. 
said "I would accept the contention ... that if the provision 
for a decision by valuers was a submission within the meaning 
of the Arbitration Act 1908 - as I think it was - the clause 
cannot exclude the Court's powers. 
117. Re Carus-Wilson and Green (1886) 18 Q.B.D.7. 
118. Supra n.26 
119, [1983] B.C.L.177. 
120. [1892] 1 Q.B.81. 
120a. [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R.261, 275. 
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The reasoning underlying Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt Co. 
is that attempts to oust the jurisdiction of the court are 
void as against public policy. Although, as seen above, this 
principle has been legislatively modified in respect of some 
English arbitrations,there has been no reform in this 
country. Even in England, only the right of appeal can be 
excluded and not, for instance, the power to remove for 
misconduct. It is therefore probable that sections which 
confer on the court a power to control the arbitrator or 
award would be held to be entrenched. Indeed these sections 
do not, in general, expressly depend on there being a 
"submission"; thus they probably apply to all arbitrations. 
B t h th t 
I • 121 , , u were e cour s powers to assist are in question 
the Czarnikow reasoning does not apply so strongly; they are 
not provisions "of paramount importance in the interests of 
the Pub l i. c 11 • l 
2 2 C t 1 . t b . b 1 t 1 d onsequen y i may e possi e o exc u e 
particular sections by agreement. 
B. Arbitrator's Powers 
The Act does not deal extensively with the powers of 
the arbitrator. This accords with the origin of his 
authority, which is contractual. The scope of his powers is 
therefore to be determined by the agreement. But the 
legislation does imply basic provisions as to procedure and 
the remedies available; these may be excluded by the 
123 contract. Perhaps the most important is the term that 
the parties "shall ... submit to be examined 
relation to the matters in dispute and shall 
on oath in 
produce 
all books, documents (etc] as may be required ... and do all 
l~l. E.g. 1938 Amendment, s.10(1) and 1st Sch. 
122. See per Atkin L.J., supra n.37 and text. 
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such other things as during the proceedings on the reference 
the arbitrators ... may require". This clause appears to 
supply broad powers to the arbiter in relation to the 
conduct of the hearing. But as has recently become apparent 
there are no sanctions to be called in aid of the 
arbitrator's directions. To enforce the parties' 
obligations thus necessitates an application to a judge, 
which itself may be ineffective. 
There is no right in the Act for the arbitrator to 
summon witnesses or require the production of evidence; 
these are reserved for the court. Other relevant matters 
are also not dealt with - such as what rules of evidence 
apply, whether a reasoned decision is required and if so, 
whether it must be in writing. The Act cannot, pace the 
learned editor of Russell on Arbitration, be described as a 
124 code. 
c. 
1. 
Court's Powers 
Powers of preclusion 
The court can under the Act, prevent an arbitration 
from beginning in two ways. First, by virtue of section 1 
the submission is irevocable unless the leave of the court is 
obtained; grant of leave thus precludes the proceedings. 
Secondly where an action is commenced in respect of a matter 
to which an arbitration clause applies, the defendant to the 
action can seek to have the court proceedings stayed. In 
both these cases the judge has a discretion to preclude the 
arbitration; the principles on which the powers will be used 
. h 1 h . h' 125 are dealt wit e sew ere in t is paper. 
124. Supra n.15, 2. 
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2. Powers of support 
The court may can help to establish the arbitration by 
appointing an arbitrator if the parties fail to agree on 
one, or if he fails to act and the parties do not supply the 
vacancy. However where, as is quite common, the agreement 
provides for an independent third party to designate the 
arbiter the court cannot act if that person fails to make 
th . 126 e appointment. 
Subpoenas may be issued by the court under sections 9 
and 19; under the former provision the order will be made 
on the application of a party, whereas section 19 appears to 
allow the arbitrator to apply for the writ. A sheaf of 
important powers exercisable by the court was added in 
1938.
127 These include orders as to: security for costs; 
discovery and interrogatories; the preservation or sale of 
goods which are the subject matter of the reference; 
inspection of property (and entry on to land for this 
purpose); and interim injunctions. The court may enlarge 
the time stipulated for making the award. But if the 
arbitrator or umpire is acting dilatorily then he can be 
removed, and he will not be entitled to be paid for his 
services128 - though, oddly, if he is removed for other 
reason he is entitled to remuneration. 
3. Powers of control 
There are four principal means which the court can 
employ, on application of a party, to control or review the 
proceedings and the award. Section 11 of the 1938 Amendment 
126. National Enterprises v Racal Communications [1975) Ch.397. 
127. Supra n.121. 
128. 1938 Amendment, s.8(1) and (2). 
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Act concerns the special case stated which has been mentioned 
above. The arbitrator may state a case of his own motion, or 
it can be directed by the court. The whole award can be 
stated, or only a question of law arising in the course of a 
reference. The judge's decision on the case is subject to 
appeal, but leave must be obtained before appealing a 
decision on a preliminary question of law. In either type of 
stated case - the whole award or the "consultative case" -
only questions of law can be decided by the court. A 
consultative case is probably only that, and the arbitrator 
is not strictly bound to accept the court's advice, but he 
may be impeached for misconduct if he rejects it. Secondly, 
section 11 of the principal Act empowers the court to "remit 
the matters referred, or any of them, to the reconsideration 
of the arbitrators". The power is thus not confined to 
remitting an award. No indication is given as to how the 
power shall be exercised. Guidance is found in the case of 
the third power, that of setting the award aside, which 
section 12(2) permits where an arbitrator has misconducted 
himself or the proceedings. Notwithstanding this difference 
in formulation the two powers are held to be exercisable on 
the same grounds. Moreover the grounds are not restricted, 
. 12(2) t . d t 130 as section sugges s, to miscon uc . 
The fourth major power is removal of the arbitrator. 
This right is also expressed to be available for misconduct. 
But it appears that the power will be 
129. Re Knight and Tabernacle Building Society [1892] 2 Q.B. 613 (though the N.Z. Act 
reads a "case for the decision [not "opinion"] of the Court") 
130. Supra n.108 and text. 
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sparingly exercised compared with the right to set aside for 
. d 131 m1scon uct. Such an approach is understandable given 
the more draconian nature of the power to remove. There are 
ancillary powers to appoint new arbiters in substitution for 
those removed; a judge can even order that the submission 
cease to have effect in this event. 132 
The primary power to award costs rests with the 
arbitrator; but where he omits to deal with the matter the 
court may direct him to decide the question. Taxation of 
h • f • 1 d th I • ' d • ' 13 3 1s ees 1s a so un er e courts Juris 1ct1on. 
4. Powers of enforcement 
Awards are enforceable by action at common law. 
procedure is somewhat cumbersome, and the statute has 
This 
accordingly established a method of summary enforcement. 
Section 13 of the principal Act provides: 
"An award on a submission may, be leave if the Court, 
be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order 
to the same effect. 
and section 12 of the 1938 Amendment Act: 
Where leave is given under Section 13 of the principal 
Act to enforce an award in the same manner as a 
judgment or order, judgment may be entered in terms of 
the award." 
The first of these does not actually give the award 
134 the status of a udgment. Consequently any relief to 
which an actual judgement is a prerequisite cannot be 
granted under section 13. The practical difficulties 
131. Russell, supra n.15, 167 
132. 1938 Amendment, s.5(2)(b). 
133. Ibid, ss.14-15. 
134. Cf. s.l: "A submission shall have the same effect in all respects as if made an 
order of Court". And cf.s.14(2). 
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entailed by this led to the passage of the second provision 
which permits, for instance, the making of bankruptcy 
orders. A further effect is that an action on the award is 
precluded once judgment is entered in terms of the award. 
Before this section was enacted a party who had successfully 
sought leave under section 13 could also bring an action, 
135 and, in some cases, had to. 
The legislation also deals with powers to enforce 
awards rendered in a foreign country. The main 
international treaty on this matter is the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958. 136 The New York Convention was 
adopted by New Zealand in 1982 and now awards to which it 
applies are "enforceable either by action or in the same 
manner as an award under the Arbitration Act 1908." However 
to enforce (or rely on) an award it must meet certain 
standards. Foreign awards which are not "Convention Awards" 
do not fall within the ambit of the 1982 Act. They may 
h d h 1 . . ·1 1 . 1 . 137 nevert eless come un er t e ear ier simi ar egis ation 
or else under the law concerning enforcement of foreign 
. d 138 JU gments. There also exists the possibility that 
foreign awards are enforceable in the same way as any 
domestic ones, quite apart from the Convention legislation. 
If the award is fully enforceable in its country of origin 
it seems that it can be executed in New Zealand pursuant to 
an action. 139 The English courts have also stated that 
135. China Steam Navigation Co. v Van Laun (1905) 22 T.L.R.26. 
136. Supra n.111. 
137. Ibid. (Act of 1933) 
138 Reciprocal Enforcpment of Judgments Act 1~34. 
139. Norske Atlas Insurance Co Ltd v London General Insurance Co Ltd. (1927) 28 
Ll.L.Rep.104. 
foreign awards can be enforced under provisions 
corresponding to section 13 (and section 12 of the 
Amendment). The statute implementing the New York 
Convention saves the possibility of enforcing Convention 
140 awards under procedures apart from that Act. 
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The Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) 
Act 1979 regulates the enforcement of awards given under the 
I.C.S.I.D. Convention. 
5. Miscellaneous 
The possibility of compulsory arbitrations under 
statute was mentioned earlier. Section 25 of the main Act 
and section 20 of the 1938 Amendment provide that while the 
provisions of the particular statute prevail, the 
b . · 1 1 - b" . 140a Ar 1trat1on Act a so app 1es to statutory ar 1trat1ons. 
In fact the application is typically also provided for in 
the particular statute . 
There is also a right in the judge to refer matters to 
b . . 141 . . h h f h ar 1trat1on, in some cases wit out t e consent o t e 
parties. By section 14 he can refer matters to a referee, 
whose report he may adopt in whole or in part (but not 
modify) . Further, under section 15 technical questions, 
matters of account or, with the litigants' consent, any 
other question can be submitted to an arbitrator of the 
parties' choosing - or to an officer of the court. 
Interestingly, such an arbitrator appears not to be bound by 
' 1·0. Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act 1982, s .8. 
140a. Although certain provisions are expressly or impliedly excluded from statutory 
arbitrations: 1938 Amendment, s.20; Russell, supra n.15, 11-12. 
141. Sections 14-15. The Court of Appeal has similar powers (s.18) as do District 
Courts: District Courts Act 1947, s.61. 
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the bulk of the provisions of the Act itself. 142 There is 
no "submission"; the arbitrator is deemed to be an officer 
of the court "and shall have all such authority, and shall 
conduct the reference in such manner, as is prescribed by 
rules of Court, and, subject thereto, as the Court directs". 
It is uncertain whether a referee under section 14 is caught 
either by these latter words or by the rest of the 
provisions of the Act (there being no "submission"). There 
is no question as to the court's powers in relation to 
references under its own order: section 17 grants it the 
usual authority it enjoys on voluntary submissions. 
142. Though he would be if the reference was from a District Court: Arbitration Act 
1980, s.20; Turner v Mardell (1983) 6 T.C.L. 31/5. 
IV 
A. 
COURTS PRECLUDING ARBITRATION 
Introduction 
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The ordinary judicial forum is often used to prevent 
an arbitration from commencing or proceeding. There are 
five ways in which this can be done, which can be summarised 
as follows. First, where there is no agreement to 
arbitrate. Second, where an agreement is rescinded by the 
conduct of the parties or by an external event. Third, 
where a valid contract exists but it is not validly invoked. 
Fourth, where the agreement is revoked by the court. And 
last, where the parties' agreement is overridden by the 
proceedings. It will be noticed that even on the level of 
terminology the conflict between the contractual and the 
juridical view is apparent. Some, at least of these 
categories could also be described in terms of want of 
jurisdiction. The first three are examples of this, while 
the latter two classes result in practice in lack of 
jurisdiction. But the answer to the question "contract or 
jurisdiction?" is less important here because where there is 
said to be no power to proceed at all, courts will intervene 
in either case. Thus in theory the court is not exercising 
any unusual powers in relation to first three; it is merely 
declaring the legal position. As to classes four and five 
the court's role is more active; these are the 
discretionary powers conferred by the statute. 
But if the court's authority is reasonably clear, the 
question throughout remains as to the arbitrator's power to 
rule on his jurisdiction. By way of clarification the term 
"jurisdiction" in this Part denotes the threshold point of 
authority. Errors in the proceedings or award which 
allegedly go to jurisdiction (in the wider sense) are 
considered below. 143 
B. No Agreement 
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Where there is an arbitration clause contained within 
the substantive contract, providing, for instance, that 
"disputes arising out of or under this contract shall be 
referred to arbitration", it might be contended that there 
is no contract and therefore no obligation to submit 
disagreements. The grounds for arguing that no contract 
existed include the contention that there was no consensus 
ad idem,
144 
or that there was no intention to create legal 
relations. In some situations where the parties to an 
arrangement wish to preserve a fluidity and amicability in 
their dealings, it might be argued that their agreements, 
whether or not bearing any semblance of formality, are not 
intended to bind them legally. (It will be recalled that 
parol agreements can still lead to arbitrations, though many 
of the statutory provisions will not apply.) Agreements 
within a family present an example. A desire for 
flexibility could also be a factor in commercial and 
industrial relationships. Parties sometimes expressly 
. . l l l . 145 disclaim the intention to create ega re ations - an 
143. Part V infra. 
144. Caerleon Tinplate Co. v Hughes (1891) 60 L.J.Q.B. 640; Anglo Newfoundland 
Development Co. v The King (1920) 2.K.B.214. 
145. Rose & Frank Co. v J.R. Compton & Bros Ltd [1925) A.C.445. In the Orion case (supra 
n.38) it was said that since arbitrators must decide according to law, a clause purporting 
to allow a decision on the basis of equity implied that there was no contract because 
legal relations were not intended to be affected. But see Eagle Star Insurance Co. v 
Yuval Insurance Co. [1978) 1 Lloyd's Rep.357. 
I 
arbitration clause in such a contract may well be 
unenforceable. 
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A further possibility is that the contract containing 
the agreement to arbitrate is either void or unenforceable. 
For example the contract may be a nullity because it is 
illegal, or it might be voidable for having been induced by 
fraudulent misrepresentations. 
If the arbitration clause is dependent on the main 
contract for its existence then it is clear that the 
invalidity of the principal agreement avoids the clause. In 
th 1 d . f H D . d 146 d e ea 1ng case o eyman v arw1ns Lt. Lor 
MacMillan agreed that if the contract was void the 
arbitration clause fell with it: 147 
"If there has never been a contract at all, there has 
never been as part of it an agreement to arbitrate.'' 
This leads into the next category, namely, where the 
contract, though originally valid, has been ended. 
c. Agreement Terminated 
In Heyman v Darwins Ltd. the appellants alleged that 
the respondents had by their conduct repudiated the 
agreement, and they sought damages in consequence. The 
respondents countered with the argument that the arbitration 
clause in the main contract was still on foot and 
accordingly the action should be stayed. The House of Lords 
held that the repudiation alleged did not deprive the 
arbitrator or of his jurisdiction to decide the issue. Lord 
·11 'd 148 MacM1 an sa1: 
146. [1942] A.C.356. 
147. Ibid, 37 2. 
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"I venture to think that not enough attention has been 
directed to the true nature and function of an 
arbitration clause in a contract. It is quite 
distinct from the other clauses ... [t]he arbitration 
clause does not impose on one of the parties an 
obligation in favour of the other. It embodies the 
agreement of both parties that, if any dispute arises 
with regard to the obligations which the one party has 
undertaken to the other, such dispute shall be decided 
by a tribunal of their own constitution. And there is 
this very material difference, that whereas in an 
ordinary contract the obligations of the parties to 
each other cannot in general be specifically enforced 
and breach of them results only in damages, the 
arbitration clause can be specific~t!¥ enforced by the 
machinery of the Arbitration Acts. 
In consequence of these distinctions, his Lordship 
. d d h d. . 150 cons1 ere tat repu 1at1on 
"does not abrogate the contract ... The contract is 
not put out of existence, though all further 
performance of the obligations undertaken by each 
party in favour of the other may cease. It survives 
for the purpose of measuring the claims arising out of 
the breach, and the arbitration clause survives for 
determining the mode of their settlement. The 
purposes of the contract have failed, but the 
arbitration clause is not one of the purposes of the 
contract." 
d . h . d 151 Lor Wr1g t sa1 : 
"It is merely procedural and ancillary, it is a mode 
of settling disputes, though the agreement to do so is 
itself subject to the discretion of the court. All 
this may be said of every agreement to arbitrate, even 
though not a separate bargain, but one incorporated in 
the general contract." 
Thus if it is argued that the main contract is 
repudiated, the arbitration clause subsists. The House of 
Lords thought that the position was the same where the 
allegation was frustration of the main contract. In so 
149. This sentence is an interesting instance of the "jurisdictional" rules being seen in 
a contractual light - th e reverse is more common. 
150. Supra n.146, 374. 
151. Ibid, 377. 
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d · th d'd t f 11 P · c ·1 d · · 152 t 01ng ey 1 no o ow a r1vy ounc1 ec1s1on o 
the contrary; the House's view has recently been preferred 
by the High Court of Australia. 153 
But what is th~·position where the attack is made on 
the arbitration clause itself, considered as an independent 
contract? The issue arose in a series of English decisions 
where although the point was relatively unimportant -
whether an arbitration can be prevented from proceeding on 
the ground of the claimant's delay - the whole nature of the 
arbitral process came under scrutiny. 
The case of Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau v South India 
Sh . . . 15 4 . 1 d d h . h 1pp1ng Corporation 1nvo ve an agreement un er w 1c 
the appellant contracted to build ships for the respondent. 
The agreement was entered into in 1964. Defects in the 
vessels discovered after delivery caused the respondents to 
complain to the shipbuilders, and led eventually to the 
former issuing a notice of intention to refer to arbitration 
in 1971. An arbitrator was appointed in 1972, but no 
application was even made to him for directions. Points of 
claim were not delivered till 1976. In 1977 the 
shipbuilders applied to the High Court for an injunction to 
restrain proceeding with the arbitration, or alternatively a 
declaration that the arbitrator had power to dismiss the 
claim for want of prosecution, on principles analogous to 
those exercised by courts in litigation. 
152. Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co. [1926] A.C.497. 
153. Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd. v State Rail Authority of N.S.W. (1982) 41 A.L.R.367. 
154. [1981] A.C.909. 
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Although the lower courts held unanimously that the 
claim could be prevented from proceeding, the House of Lords 
by a bare majority decided that no grounds existed for 
halting the arbitration. For the majority Lord Diplock 
dealt first with the argument, accepted by Donaldson J. and 
Lord Denning,
155 
that the High Court had inherent power to 
dismiss a claim for want of prosecution. This argument 
failed, according to Lord Diplock, due to the fundamental 
difference between arbitrators and High Court judges. The 
analogy was false because, although the procedure in the two 
types of proceedings was often similar, it need not be so; 
the court was constrained by its rules, whereas an 
arbitration could be conducted in a variety of ways, even 
dispensing with a hearing. And more importantly, the source 
of the arbiter's jurisdiction differed in each case. A 
court was invested with a constitutional function by the 
state; submission to its jurisdiction was mandatory for a 
defendant once a plaintiff had initiated the process, and 
thus the court required the power to prevent its procedures 
being "misused in such a way as to diminish its capability 
of arriving at a just decision of the dispute". 
On the other hand Lords Scarman and Fraser (who each 
agreed with the other's opinion) emphasised the similarities 
of the judicial and arbitral processes. Both were 
adversarial in nature, which suggested that a defendant 
should not be obliged to act against his own interests by 
applying to advance the arbitration when the claimant had 
been guilty of delay. Furthermore Lord Scarman had a 
155, Roskill L.J. preferred to base his decision on the ground that there was an implied 
obligation on the claimant to proceed expeditiously: ibid.954. Cumming-Bruce L.J. 
supported both analyses: ibid, 961. 
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more fundamental objection; he disagreed that arbitration 
was a purely contractual phenomenon and saw it as imbued 
with judicial elements - the principle that parties to an 
arbitration agreement take it with all its faults "is not of 
universal application. It has not yet achieved such 
supremacy as totally to oust the power of the High Court to 
remedy or prevent an injustice in the arbitration 
process 11 • 156 In the result his Lordship would have held 
that the High Court's power extended to granting an 
injunction against the arbitration proceeding, because there 
had been ordinate and inexcusable delay, not due to the 
defendant, which seriously prejudiced the prospect of a fair 
arbitration. 
Both Lord Diplock and the minority Law Lords also 
considered the problem from a contractual point of view. In 
fact, because of his attitude on the first point, 
contractual principles were the only ones seen as available 
by Lord Diplock. Thus he considered whether, on such 
principles, an injunction could be granted. All the Law 
Lords agreed that an injunction would only issue to protect 
a legal or equitable right. The main ground alleged was 
repudiation, as evinced by the respondent's conduct in not 
prosecuting his claim. However repudiation is negatived by 
fault on the party seeking to rely on it. Since Lord 
Diplock construed the arbitration agreement as imposing a 
mutual duty on both parties to pursue the arbitration, the 
appellant shipbuilder was at fault in failing to apply 
jointly with the respondent to the arbitrator for 
directions. 
156. Ibid, 996. 
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The Court of Appeal and the minority in the House of 
Lords thought that there was no "mutual" obligation, merely 
one incumbent on the claimant, and therefore the doctrine of 
repudiatory breach was available to the respondent. 
end, then, the result sought by the minority could be 
In the 
reached in either way: "whether the denial be viewed as a 
denial of natural justice or a fundamental breach of 
contract, it constitutes a legal injury from which the court 
t 1 . f b . . . ,,157 may gran re 1e y 1nJunct1on ... As a matter of 
contract Lord Scarman put his decision on the basis of a 
legal right to be free from frustrating delay, breach of 
158 which found an action in damages. Lord Fraser 
formulated it as an equitable right not to be harassed by 
arbitration proceedings which cannot lead to a fair 
t . l 159 r1a . 
What all the judges (except Donaldson J.) agreed on 
was that an arbitrator not did himself have power to dismiss 
h 1 . f f . 160 t e c aim or want o prosecution. This is clearly 
supportable, since his powers rest on the foundation of 
contract and statute - if neither is the source of such a 
power he cannot usurp it. It is right to note however that 
the English Arbitration Act 1979 is said to have widened the 
powers of an arbitrator to deal with the problem illustrated 
161 by the facts of Bremer Vulkan. 
157. Ibid, 1000 per Lord Scannan. 
158. Ibid, 998-999. 
159. Ibid, 993 
160. E.g. Lord Diplock, ibid. 987; Lord Scarman, 1001. 
161. Section 5 allows an arbitrator to apply to the High Court for an order "to proceed 
with the reference in default of appearance ..• in like manner as a judge ••• might 
continue with proceedings ... " However "proceeding with the reference" may not meet the 
difficulty, at least not in the expeditious way a dismissal for non-prosecution would. 
75 
The decision of the House of Lords did not pass 
162 uncriticised, either by the commentators or by lower 
courts in the English hierarchy. Lord Denning M.R., for 
example, was able to describe Lord Diplock's concept of a 
mutual obligation as obiter and erroneous and Kerr L.J., 
claimed the decision had been received "with the greatest 
concern 11 •
163 
Bremer Vulkan was a case where six views (of 
experienced commercial judges) were subordinated to three, 
expressed in one opinion only. A more fundamental 
criticism, however, was the prospect of long-dormant 
arbitrations being revived, where facts had been forgotten 
and witnesses or arbitrators lost track of. In such 
circumstances it is doubtful whether a fair trial of the 
issues was possible. It is questionable how realistic is 
the implication of a term that both parties are under an 
obligation to keep the arbitration alive, based merely on 
the contractual nature of arbitration. In many cases of 
commercial contracts, it has been suggested, arbitration 
clauses are inserted almost reflexively at the end of 
d . . 164 rawn-out negotiations. If a dispute does arise but 
the claimant neglects to prosecute his claim why should the 
respondent be under a duty to assist him? The latter will 
be obliged to submit in accordance with his undertaking in 
the arbitration clause, but there is a distinction between 
an active and a passive duty. Since in most arbitrations 
162. E.g. P. Matthews "The Sleeping and the Dead" [1982] L.M.C. L.Q.401. 
163. Paal Wilson & Co. v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal (The Hannah Blumenthal) [1982] 
3 W.L.R.49, 58, 67. 
164. Lord Hacking "A New Competition - Rivals for the Centres of Arbitration" [1979] 
L.M.C.L.Q.435. 
76 
the proceedings are adversarial it does not seem reasonable 
to require the respondent to stimulate the claimant into 
action. 
Nevertheless in The Hannah Blumentha1165 the House 
of Lords affirmed Bremer Vulkan, albeit as much on the basis 
f d t . . 166 o prece en as on its merits. The consequence is that 
delay by the claimant must amount to a breach of contract 
before the respondent is entitled to an injunction 
restraining further proceedings. Such a breach will not 
however take the form of repudiation since the "fault" of 
the respondent will preclude him from alleging repudiation. 
The contract can be discharged by frustration. For 
example Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulkan characterised bias of 
th b . t t f f f · l 6 7 ear i ra or as a orm o rustration. But 
frustration is not available if either of the parties are at 
fault; and since in the case of delay one of the parties is 
usually culpable, it is unlikely that this basis will 
succeed in achieving an injunction in many cases. 
A third ground for staying the arbitration by 
injunction is where both parties have expressly or impliedly 
agreed to abandon the agreement. If abandonment can be 
spelled out of the parties' conduct, including circumstnces 
of delay, there is the possibility of avoiding an 
165. Supra n.163, 1149, H.L. 
166. Even this might not have settled the matter, at least in New Zealand: see the 
remarks of Cooke J. in Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation N.Z. Ltd [1981) 1.N.Z.L.R.368, 371. 
167. Supra n.154, 981. 
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unsatisfactory trial. But this defence failed in The Hannah 
Blumenthal, although there the House of Lords approved the 
Court of Appeal's decision in The Splendid Sun168 
preventing the arbitration on the basis of abandonment. 
D. No Dispute Within Agreement 
An arbitration agreement is not validly invoked if 
there is no dispute within it. To determine this the actual 
agreement must be looked at. Further, as noted, in New 
Zealand there need not be a "dispute" if the second limb of 
the definition of "submission" is invoked. Any question or 
matter, such as a valuation, can be referred. But this 
aside, what powers do the court and the arbitrator have when 
it is said that no difference exists between the parties 
which is covered by the agreement? 
In Bremer Vulkan Lord Diplock said169 that whether 
or not a dispute existed was a matter for the arbitrator, 
and no injunction would be granted. It was said in North 
London Railway Co. v Great Northern Railway Co. 170 that 
the High Court had no power to grant an injunction to 
restrain an arbitration in a matter beyond the agreement to 
refer "although such arbitration may be futile and 
vexatious". The minority in Bremer Vulkan doubted the 
validity of these last words, which it claimed were not part 
of the ratio. It seems clear that an arbitrator is entitled 
at least to make a preliminary ruling on the matter. The 
court will nevertheless regard itself as the final arbiter 
on the matter. 
spite 
It might refuse to stay an action brought in 
168. Andr~ & Cie. S.A. v Marine Transocean Ltd. [1981) Q.B.694. 
169. Supra n.154, 981. 
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of an arbitration clause - and indeed it has no jurisdiction 
to stay the Court proceedings if there is no "matter agreed 
to be referred". 171 Alternatively a declaration can be 
granted if the whole or part of the matters in contention 
are found to be outside the submission. This in Government 
172 of Gibraltar v Kenney a standard arbitration clause 
was inserted in a contract of service. After the work had 
been done disputes arose and Mr Kenney submitted points of 
claim to the arbitrator, including one for payment on a 
quantum meruit and another for compensation under the 
frustrated contracts legislation. The plaintiff applied for 
a declaration that these claims did not arise out of the 
contract. The judge held that he had jurisdiction to make 
h d 1 . 173 sue a ec arat1on (although it was refused on the 
A similar result could have been merits of the case). 
reached if the plaintiff had brought an action at law and 
then resisted the defendant's motion for a stay; but of 
course here the plaintiff was not the claimant in the 
arbitration. 
E. Revocation of Agreement 
Section 3 of the Arbitration Act reads in part: 
"A submission, unless a contrary intention is 
expressed therein, shall be irrevocable, except by 
leave of the Court ... " 
This section cured (in relation to ''submissions") the 
defect of the common law which allowed either party to 
171. Arbitration Act 1908, s.5(1); Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd. v Kamgarn Spinnerei GmbH 
[1977] 1 W.L.R.713, H.L. See infra. 
172, [1956) 2 Q,B.410. 
173, Ibid, 421. See too The Phonizien [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 150, where a declaration was 
granted. 
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revoke an agreement to refer future disputes, in the sense 
of refusing to proceed with it - though such party would be 
174 liable for damages. It has been held that, since a 
submission at common law was irrevocable in the sense of 
being a breach of contract, section 1 actually refers to 
revocation of the arbitration's authority175 and the 
modernised language of the English Act reflects this. But 
in practice there is no difference because in both cases the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction has been withdrawn. 
The provision plainly is aimed at unilateral 
revocation; the parties can at any time agree not to 
proceed with the arbitration. Where only one party wishes 
to avoid the arbitral proceedings however he must apply to 
the court. 
With two exceptions no indication is given in the 
statute as to the principles on which the court will grant 
leave. The exceptions, added in 1938, 176 deal with the 
cases of alleged partiality of the arbitrator and 
allegations of fraud against parties. The second provision 
may be evidence of a legislative intention that questions of 
fraud should not be dealt with in the privacy of an arbitral 
hearing but rather in open court. But apart from these the 
power is open-ended on its face. Nevertheless the general 
attitude of the courts is that it should be used only 
sparingly and to avoid a substantial miscarriage of 
justice. 177 As distinct from the three categories 
174, Re Smith & Service and Nelson & Sons (18.~0) 25 Q.B.D.545. 
175. Ibid, 550, 
176, Arbitration Amendment Act 1938, s.16(1) and (2). 
177. Russell, supra n.15, 162. 
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. 1 d' d 178 . h . . . previous y iscusse , revocation oft e submission is a 
direct interference with the contractual rights of the 
parties; it does not merely purport to declare them. 
Where, therefore, a party contends that there is no 
contract, or no dispute within it, a remedy other than 
section 3 must be used. On the other hand there may be some 
overlap with the other statutory remedies. For instance, 
misconduct of the arbitrator will found an application for 
revocation as well as one for the removal of the arbitrator, 
or for the setting aside of the award. This also 
illustrates the point that revocation is available at any 
time before or during the arbitral proceedings. 
F. 
1 . 
Agreement Overriden by Other Proceedings 
Introduction 
The final method of precluding the arbitration is by 
permitting an action at law on disputes which are covered by 
the arbitration clause. Like the preceding category it 
constitutes a denial of the parties contractual rights and 
obligations. Historically this is justified by the courts 
for the reason that, where the two principles of the 
sanctity of the court's jurisdiction and the sanctity of 
contract are in conflict, the former must prevail. Thus 
before the middle of the last century any action brought in 
breach of an arbitration contract would automatically be 
allowed to proceed; to give effect to the clause would oust 
the jurisdiction of the court. But in 1854 Parliament 
intervened in favour of contracting parties. By the Common 
Law Procedure Act 179 the judges were granted a discretion 
178. Though see n.167 supra and text. 
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to stay the proceeding of the action where there was an 
arbitration agreement and there was "no sufficient reason" 
why the matter should not be referred under it. 
Essentially the same provision exists in New Zealand 
today as section 5 of the Act. The power to grant or refuse 
a stay of court proceedings is an important and much used 
one. The section contains a mixture of the power and the 
grounds for invoking it, although the latter are left very 
vague. Thus the power can be used to enforce the true state 
of the parties common law relationship - for example if 
there is no valid contract a stay will be refused. 
Alternatively even where a valid submission exists the court 
has a statutory discretion to refuse to give effect to it. 
Thus the section bestrides the broad distinction made 
between the first three and last two categories discussed in 
180 this Part of the paper. 
2. Grounds 
The onus is initially on the party seeking to go to 
arbitration to prove that the clause is valid and covers 
dispute. 181 He must also not have taken step in the any 
action, such as filing a defence, and must be willing to 
arbitrate. Once this is shown the onus switches to the 
the 
plaintiff in the action to demonstrate why it should not be 
stayed. 182 If he cannot show "sufficient reason" then the 
judge may (not "must") stay the court proceedings. The 
power is thus very wide on its face. In the extensive 
variety of circumstances in which stays are sought it is 
difficult to ascertain how stringently the courts enforce 
180. See Part IV A, supra. 
181. Gisborne Harbour Board v Spencer [1961] N.Z.L.R.204. 
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the burden of showing a absence of sufficient reason not to 
arbitrate. This principle was emphasised in the case of 
Fakes v Taylor Woodrow Ltd. 183 but there the stay was 
refused and the trial proceeded. The plantiff in the action 
was suing because he could not afford to pursue his claim in 
an arbitration as legal aid was not available for arbitral 
proceedings. The defendants moved for a stay; their reason 
was conceded to be that: 184 
''they thought the action was ill-founded and the 
quickest way to stop it was to stay the action -
believing that Mr Fakes had no money to take it to 
arbitration. That would make Taylor Woodrow judges in 
their own cause." 
"The majority of the English Court of Appeal took a 
poor view of arbitration in these circumstances. 
"It is bad enough for a poor man to be faced with an 
arbitration clause, usually in a printed form which he 
has never read. It is much worse if the courts then 
insist that he is to go off to arbitration where there 
is no legal aid." 
The Master of the Rolls also found that the 
plaintiff's poverty - he was insolvent - was caused by the 
defendant's breach of the main contract; it would amount to 
a denial of justice if the arbitration was to be compelled. 
Legislative guidance on the principles to be employed 
in granting or refusing a stay of proceedings are sparse. 
However, as with the power to revoke the submission, 
allegations of want of impartiality against the arbiter and 
of fraud against a party, are relevant. Thus subsections 
(1) and (3) of section 16 of the 1983 Amendment Act 
envisage an application for a stay where there is a charge 
of bias against an arbitrator under a contract to refer 
183. [1973] Q.B.436. 
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future disputes. These provisions interfered with the 
parties' acknowledged common law right to waive by consent 
any suggestion of disqualifying interest present in the 
arbitrator - as, for example, where he has a professional 
relationship with one of the parties. But where their 
agreement is one to submit an existing dispute - a compromis 
- the parties are free to relinquish their right an arbiter 
untainted by any suggestion of partiality. 185 
In addition to the specific statutory provisions 
concerning charges against the arbitrator or parties 
personally, there are situations where the courts will 
exercise their general power to stay because of allegations 
of improper conduct. The rationale for these cases is 
probably the same as that underlying the special statutory 
rules. That is, courts are a more appropriate forum for 
such charges, since they sit in public and, for that reason 
(among others), command more of the public confidence. So a 
party whose character or conduct is impugned should have the 
opportunity of openly clearing his name. Thus in Green v 
Howe11 186 Buckley L.J., referring to an earlier case at 
first instance, said: 
"the second ground was that in as mu c h as there was a 
question between the partners whether the partner 
giving the notice had acted in good faith, that was a 
charge which ought to be dealt with by a Court of 
justice and not by an arbitrator. That, of course, 
was a perfectly good ground." 
Misconduct on the part of the arbitrator during the 
proceedings is also a ground for refusing to stay court 
185. See Canterbury Pipe Lines Ltd. v Att.-Gen . [19 61] N. Z.L.R.785, 791. 
186. [1910] 1 Ch.495. 
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d . 187 procee 1ngs. However misconduct is generally dealt 
with under another statutory provision. 
Delay in applying to the court has been held in 
England to be a reason for the judge to decline to grant a 
stay. The period of time between the start of the action 
was eighteen months; however the case was also one where 
the applicability of the arbitration clause was not made 
t 188 OU. 
The nature of the question to be decided may also 
influence the judge's decision. As seen above, where there 
are allegations of fraud or improper conduct the court 
considers them best suited for ordinary judicial 
proceedings, especially if the accused person desires 
th . 189 lS. Another example is where the dispute involves a 
question of law. This goes to the basic tension between the 
arbitral and judicial processes. Where issues of law are 
involved the argument that the need for specialist expertise 
requires the withdrawal of the disagreement from the courts 
is weaker. But the principle remains that contracting 
parties are entitled to refer legal questions; moreover, it 
may be very difficult to separate the factual from the 
legal. The construction of documents, a matter of law, is 
involved in many (perhaps most) arbitrations. What point 
would there be in inserting clauses providing for 
arbitration of "any disputes arising out of or under this 
contract" if such disputes were to be diverted to the 
courts? The reality 
187. Russell, supra n.15, 201. 
188. The Elizabeth H [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep.172. 
189. E.g. Eagle v N.I.M.U. Insurance Co. [1967] N.Z .L.R.698. 
probably is that many questions of law are in fact dealt 
with to the parties' satisfaction by legal or lay 
arbitrators, and the courts never get the chance to 
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pronounce on them. The legal correctness of the decision is 
often not the most important factor for the parties. 
However if a court is seised of the matter the legal 
nature of the dispute will be held a relevant consideration. 
The judge might have to decide the question in any event: 
it may be "absolutely useless to stay the action because it 
will only come back to the court on a case stated 11 • 190 
Where the agreement provides for arbitration in an 
overseas country the court's power to stay proceedings 
derives from a different source. The main statute in this 
regard is the Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) 
9 2 191 . l . h N k C . Act 1 8 , imp ementing t e ew Yor onvention. 
Section 4 provides that where there is a relevant 
arbitration agreement and one party commences legal 
proceedings "in respect of any matter in dispute between the 
parties which the parties have agreed to refer" then, on 
application, 
"the Court shall, unless the arbitration is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, 
make an order staying the proceedings.-
This section differs from the stay of proceedings 
provision in the 1908 Act in several ways. The court 
"shall'' stay the action where the agreement is to arbitrate 
190. Bristol Corp. v Aird & Co. (1913] A.C. 241, 262. 
191. Supra n.111. The corresponding section in the 1933 Act was repealed in 1982. 
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in a foreign country. Secondly the grounds for refusing a 
stay are specified in the statute rather than expressed as a 
general ground to be determined in each case. Thirdly the 
grounds are limited to radical faults in the agreement 
itself - nullity, ineffectiveness and incapability of 
performance. And fourthly the applicant for a stay is not 
b d b h . t k t . th t d · l g 2 arre y aving a en as ep in e cour procee 1ngs. 
The sum of the differences is that a party who contracts to 
arbitrate overseas is more likely to have his agreement 
respected by New Zealand courts than a party to a domestic 
arbitration agreement. Much of the judicial discretion has 
been removed as a result of the interposition of 
international law. 
In some jurisdictions the grounds for refusing a stay 
are limited even in domestic arbitrations. Thus the United 
States Arbitration Act193 provides that the court: 
"upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such 
suit ... is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties 
stay the trial of the action until the arbitration has 
been had, ... providing the applicant ... is not in 
default in proceeding with such application." 
3. Comment 
To return to section 5 of the 1908 Act, the opacity of 
its drafting can be seen as highlighting a more basic 
question: why is the arbitration contract not specifically 
enforceable? Once a valid agreement has been shown, should 
not the issue be one of enforcing it rather than discussing 
whether or not an action should be stayed? A submission is 
192. This condition has been carried over in the corresponding English legislation 
implementing the New York Convention: Arbitration Act 1975 (U.K.), s.1(1). 
193. Supra n.50, s.3. 
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not specifically enforceable in equity, 194 nor is there a 
section in the Act providing for such enforcement. It has 
been said that effectively specific performance is available 
195 by means of the statute; but the emphasis of the 
section is otherwise. 
A contrast may be made with three other legal systems: 
domestic, private international and public international. 
I th St t f N Y k h 1 . 1 . 196 . f d . n e a e o ew or t e egis ation is rame in 
terms of allowing a stay of the arbitration only on the 
grounds that a valid agreement was not made or complied 
with, or the claim is time-barred. The New York Convention 
itself is drafted in similar terms: "the court ... shall 
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that 
the said agreement is null and void [etc.]". But when 
translated into New Zealand legislation, as seen above, 
there is a subtle difference in emphasis. 
On the level of public international law the question 
is also one of enforceability. In the Arnbatielos case 197 
Greece sought an order from the International Court to the 
effect that the United Kingdom was obliged to go to 
arbitration over an alleged injury to a Greek national. The 
arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction over "all claims based on 
a [a treaty of 1886)". The court held that the issue was 
whether the Greek arguments were sufficiently plausible to 
conclude that the claim in question was based on the treaty. 
194. Doleman & Sons v Ossett Corp. (1912] 3 K.B.257. 
195. Supra n.149 and text. 
196. Supra n.107, s.3. 
197. (1953] I.C.J.Rep.10. 
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There had to be more than a remote connection but an 
unassailable legal basis did not have to be shown. It was 
enough that the question was arguable. The court decided on 
this basis that the Greek contention was valid and thus the 
claim should go to arbitration. 
V 
A. 
COURTS CONTROLLING ARBITRATION 
Introduction 
89 
The foregoing discussion was concerned mainly with 
judicial intevention at or before the establishment of the 
arbitration in order to prevent it proceeding. (The 
converse question of enforcement of the agreement was also 
raised). Once the arbitrator has embarked on the hearing 
however the issues become somewhat different, even if there 
is an overlap in the remedies for each situation. In the 
instances now to be considered it is assumed that the 
arbitration agreement is valid and subsisting. It therefore 
becomes more difficult for the court intervening in the 
proceedings or reviewing the award to justify its action on 
contractual principles. The grounds for interference 
increasingly approximate to those commonly employed in the 
supervision of inferior tribunals and courts of law 
established by the state. 198 On the other hand judicial 
intercession can be seen as deriving its authority from the 
concept of vires - the body being reviewed has to observe 
the limits of its authority, whether such limits are imposed 
by statute or contract. This is the basis on which, if at 
. . 11 1 . d 199 all, review 1s genera y exp a1ne . 
Two further points can be made, one from each side of 
the argument. First, the vires concept, though readily 
understandable and acceptable to the courts, seems to depend 
on a relatively legalistic perception. If the arbitration 
198. Contrast, for example, the terminology used in the headings in Parts IV and V. of 
this paper. 
199. See e.g. Lord Diplock's speech in Bremer Vulkan, supra n.154 (though relating to 
pre-arbitration proceedings, the concepts are similar). 
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is viewed more simply as two individuals making use of their 
rights of self-determination to reach a decision, via an 
agreed third person with delegated power to bind them, then 
it becomes hard to see what the court can attach itself to. 
The whole process is quite outside the legal system. The 
public international sphere is the best illustration of the 
argument, since there is no judicial institution with the 
right to interfere unless the parties have granted such a 
right. 
The second point is that judicial control even in 
common law legal systems is not necessarily an example of 
courts arrogating to themselves the power to intervene in 
private arrangements. Arbitration has been regulated by 
t t t . E 1 d f 1 h . 2 00 d h s au e in ng an or a most tree centuries, an t e 
existence of the Arbitration Act demonstrates a legislative 
intention that a measure of control be exercised over 
private arbiters of disputes by the ordinary tribunals of 
the sate. Nevertheless insofar as the scope of the 
controlling jurisdiction is left undefined by the Act, the 
courts exercise considerable powers. 
B. Errors Concerning Juri~diction 
1. Arbitrator's power 
A preliminary question is whether the arbitrator has 
the power to decide, either provisionally or finally, as to 
his own jurisdiction. Plainly there must be power to do the 
first of these; otherwise, any challenge to his authority 
would incapacitate him from acting further. The power 
extends even to determining the existence of the contract. 
200. Arbitration Act 1698, supra n.102 
• 
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In Brown v Osterreichischer Waldbesitzer 201 the defendants 
in an action on an award claimed that the contract was not 
binding since the parties had never been ad idem, and thus 
the arbitrator had no power to act. 
202 argument: 
Devlin J. rejected this 
"It is clear that at the beginning of any arbitration 
one side or the other may challenge the jurisdiction 
of the arbitrator. It is not the law that 
arbitrators, if their jurisdiction is challenged or 
questioned, are bound immediately to refuse to act 
until their jurisdiction has been determined by some 
court which has power to determine it finally. Nor is 
it the law that they are bound to go on without 
investigating the merits of the challenge and to 
determine the matter in dispute, leaving the question 
of their jurisdiction to be held over until it is 
determined by some other court which has power to 
determine it. They might then be merely wasting their 
time and everybody else's. They are not obliged to 
take either course. They are entitled to inquire into 
the merits of the issue whether they have jurisdiction 
or not, not for the purpose of reaching any conclusion 
which will be binding upon the parties - because that 
they cannot do - but for the purpose of satisfying 
themselves as a preliminary matter whether they ought 
to go on with the arbitration or not." 
As indicated in this passage the judge did not 
consider that the arbitrator had final jurisdiction on the 
matter. This was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal 
in Dalmia Dairy Industries v National Bank of Pakistan. 203 
The contract there incorporated the arbitration rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce - which expressly 
permitted the arbitrator to decide on his own jurisdiction 
201. [1954] 1 Q.B.8. 
20 2 . Ibid, 12-13. 
203. [197 8 ] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223, 283. 
finally. The court, disapproving the judge at first 
instance, said that Indian law, which was the applicable 
law, 204 would not allow effect to be given to such a 
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clause so as to allow an arbitrator finally to determine his 
own jurisdiction. 
205 Professor Schmitthoff has suggested that the 
English Arbitration Act 1979 would overturn this decision by 
permitting exclusion of judicial review of awards, the 
I.C.C. clause constituting an exclusion agreement. It might 
be said, however, that if the arbitrator wrongly decides 
that he has jurisdiction then the whole proceedings are a 
nullity and there is thus no "award" and no appeal from 
it206 - the 1979 Act abolishes review of awards, 
207 substituting rights of appeal on points of law. But 
this argument tends to approach logical extremes: if the 
arbitration is a nullity then, even before the 1979 Act, 
there would have been nothing capable of being set aside; 
and an action for a declaration of nullity or resisting 
enforcement would have been the only available remedies. 
208 Disregarding this type of argument, it is submitted 
that, as Schmitthoff acknowledges, the courts would be 
204. And which was held to be the same as English law on the point. 
205. Supra n.31, 24. 
206. See~ v Jones (Gwyn) [1969] 2 Q.B.33. 
207. Despite the marginal note to s.l of the Act referring to ·~udicial review of 
arbitration awards". 
208. Oil Products Trading Co. v Societe de Gestion d'Entreprises Coloniales (1934) 150 
L.T.475. 
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unlikely to decide that they could not ultimately define the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction. An analogy with administrative 
law demonstrates that jurisdictional questions cannot easily 
be insulated against review. And in New Zealand there is 
no equivalent of the English Act of 1979; the Czarnikow 
209 
principle would still apply. 
In the law of nations the rule is different. Unless a 
right of recourse to another judicial body is granted by the 
parties, international tribunals are judges of their own 
jurisdiction. Thus article 36(6) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides for the court itself 
to settle disputes on its jurisdiction in any particular 
matter before it. 
Interestingly the model Rules on Arbitral 
209a Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission 
are to the same effect. Article 9 reads: 
"The arbitral tribunal, which is the judge of its own 
competence, has the power to interpret the compromis 
and the other instruments on which that competence is 
based." 
But the rules do provide for recourse to the International 
Court on some matters, including revision of the award on 
the basis of new evidence. 
2. Disqualification 
The arbitrator may be, or may become, disqualified to 
act. This can arise in a number of ways. For instance it 
is quite common in arbitrations of business disputes for the 
clause to stipulate arbitration by "commercial men" and not 
lawyers. Alternatively it might specify a barrister as 
209. Supra n.26 
209a. Wetter, supra n.52. 
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arbitrator. If this condition is not fulfilled there is no 
authority to act. Thus in Jungheim Hopkins & Co. v 
Foukelman 210 the person appointed as arbitrator had to be 
a member of a particular trade association; the requirement 
was not met. The court declared the award void for lack of 
jurisdiction. An appointment might be invalid for breaching 
a formal requisite of the process, such as failing to name 
the arbiter within a specified time, or a condition imposed 
by the law. Thus it has been held that the appointment of 
an umpire by the two arbitrators cannot be done by lot: 
th t b . f . d 2 11 ere mus e an exercise o JU gment. 
The arbitrator may be disqualified by reason of bias. 
Or he might purport to act after the submission has been 
revoked or an order for his removal made. In these cases 
too he clearly is unable to act. In many of these examples 
objection can be taken when or before he acts. But if the 
disqualification does not become known until after the award 
has been rendered, the only avenue of attack is against the 
decision itself. There may nevertheless be objections to 
this sort of challenge, based on alleged waiver of defects 
or another form of estoppel. 
3 • Failure to exercise jurisdiction 
The arbiter occasionally fails to act. If the failure 
is blatant, for example by not attending at the hearing, 
then the statute allows the parties or the court to appoint 
212 another. Moreover a dilatory arbitrator can be removed 
by the court. 213 
210. [1909]2 K.B.948. 
211. Pescod v Pescod (1887)58 L.T.76. But they may ballot from a panel properly 
selected. 
212. 7 
s.8 
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The refusal or failure to act more often occurs during 
the course of the hearing. Again there are a variety of 
possibilities. The arbitrator must genuinely participate in 
the hearing and the decision. In a recent case 214 one of 
a panel of three arbitrators left the country during the 
course of the hearing, leaving a blank award form with his 
signature. Although section 6(2) of the 1938 Amendment Act 
permits a majority award, Parker J. held that all the 
arbitrators had to take part in the decision. The absence 
of the third arbitrator should have been remedied by a new 
appointment or an adjournment. Since the award had 
nonetheless been delivered it would have been set aside, had 
there not been a waiver of the objection. 
Nor can an arbitrator, a fortiori, delegate his 
decision to someone who is not an arbitrator in the dispute, 
without the parties' consent. The maxim delegatus non 
potest delegare applies, as in the law of agency and 
administrative law, to the office of arbitrator. But there 
is some flexibility in the principle; while a particular 
arbitrator may have been chosen for his expertise in a 
particular trade there may be a variety of issues remitted 
for his decision, and he cannot be assumed to be expert in 
all of them. A plain example is a legal question arising in 
the course of the hearing before a lay arbitrator. The 
consultative case procedure is available but the parties may 
not desire to use it. Can an arbitrator seek advice from a 
lawyer? The general principle appears to permit the 
reception of such advice, and also of other professional 
214. European Grain & Shivping Ltd. v R. Johnston [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep.414; affirmed 
[1983]2 W.L.R.241, C.A. 
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people, so long as the arbitrator independently exercises 
his judgment on the dispute. So in a case where the umpire 
made an award subject to the opinion of his attorney on 
certain legal questions the decision was set aside as being 
215 in reality the attorney's. In a New Zealand case, Re 
216 Moore and MacGregor, Turner J. remitted an award where 
the arbitrator had made up his mind but consulted a 
solicitor who assisted him to put his thoughts in writing -
moreover it was one of the parties' solicitor. 
The arbitrator also fails to exercise his discretion 
if he does not adjudicate on matters referred to him. Such 
a failure might be deliberate or an omission - An example of 
h f . ' . 21 7 h f h . 1 t e ormer is Heine v King were one o t e pivota 
questions for decision was whether the defendant was 
responsible for an omission by its clerk. The arbitrator 
expressly declined to make a finding on this point and the 
award was set aside and the arbitrator removed. 218 The 
failure to decide might also take the form if reserving 
questions for later determination. The arbitrator in Re 
Tandy and Tandy219 had done this; in addition he claimed 
the right to appoint counsel to settle future disputes, 
which was clearly an invalid delegation: 
2~5. Ellison v Bray (1864)9 L.T.730. 
216. (1959] N.Z.L.R.78 
217. (1983) B.C.L. 651 
218. Although removal was not apparently sought by the plaintiff. 
219. (1841) 5 Jur. 726. 
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the award was bad. A case decided by the Exchequer 
220 
Chamber concerned an arbitration to determine 
compensation for the action of the London Metropolitan Board 
of Works in removing the Duke of Buccleuch's causeway into 
the river Thames. The umpire had awarded a sum for, inter 
alia, depreciation in the value of the duke's premises. 
Blackburn J. said: 
"Accordingly it still remains open to a party to plead 
to an award any matter which shows that ~he arbitrator 
has not pursued his authority; either, in cases where 
he is required to make a final determination on all 
matters, by not determining some matter brought before 
him which he ought to determine ... " 
But the courts sometimes emphasise that, since many 
arbitrators are not legally trained, their awards will not 
be scrutinised to ensure that every point raised before them 
is dealt with separately. "If, on a fair interpretation of 
an award it is to be presumed that the claim has been taken 
into consideration" the award will be upheld. This 
statement was made in a case 222 where the award referred 
to the neglect by lessees of "certain matters of general 
maintenance". The judge was prepared to infer that all the 
claims submitted had been decided on by the umpire. 
Finally it is possible that the arbitrator expressly 
refuses to make an award. In one case where this happened 
it was said that the whole reference was abortive and an 
223 action in the court was permitted to proceed. 
220. Duke of Buccleuch v Metropolitan Board of Works (1870) L.R.5 Ex.2 21 (reversed at 
(1872) L.R.5 H.L. 418 but not on this point). 
221. Ibid., 230. 
222. Mackintosh v Castle Land Co. [1943] 1 N.Z.L.R. 194 
223. Weir v Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co. (1902) 4 G.L.R.440. 
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4. Excess of Jurisdiction 
The award can decide on matters which have not been 
referred. Clearly the arbitrator must have in his mind what 
the parties are in disagreement over, and he cannot go 
beyond those matters. In Falkingham v Victorian Railways 
C . . 224 h b. . . d onun1ss1oner tear 1trat1on clause prov1 ed for 
reference of certain types of dispute only. In an action on 
the award, the respondent in the arbitration (the 
Conunissioner) alleged that the arbitrators had awarded on 
matters not referable under the contract. The Privy Council 
said 
"Their Lordships agree that if a lump sum be 
awarded by an arbitrator, and it appears on the face 
of the award or be proved by extrinsic evidence that 
in arriving at the lump sum matters were taken into 
account which the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to 
consider, the award is bad." 
But, similarly to the case of alleged failure to exercise 
jurisdiction, it was necessary for the arbitrators to state 
expressly that they had not looked at irrelevant matters. 
They had been fully apprised of the limits of their 
jurisdiction, so that any disregard of its bounds must have 
been intentional, had not been pleaded. 
In public international law also excess of 
jurisdiction constitutes a ground of invalidity of awards. 
There is one case in the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice, that of the Arbitral Award Made by the 
King of Spain225 in a boundary dispute between Honduras 
and Nicaragua. The court decided the substance of the case 
on the basis of preclusion (estoppel); but it went on to 
hold that allegations of, inter alia, exces de pouvoir had 
224. [1900] A.C.452. See also Re Riverton Borough and N.Z.Dreadnought Gas Co. (1916] 
N.Z.L.R.601. 
225. [1960] I.C.J. Rep.192. 
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not been established. The King made an award in 1906 under 
a treaty prescribing the basic methods to be used in 
defining the frontier. Nicaragua alleged that he had failed 
to observe these fundamental principles, and also that he 
had exercised a power vested not in the arbitration but in 
another body involved in the delineation process, the mixed 
boundary commission. The court read the treaty provisions 
rather broadly, saying that they were intended to be only a 
guide, and for both the participants in the boundary 
definition. 
The case shows a more liberal interpretation of the 
concept of excess of jurisdiction than the domestic law 
cases considered above. The court entertained arguments 
that the award was founded on wrong principles of law, 
though such contentions were not accepted. By contrast the 
domestic cases appear to employ a strict concept of 
jurisdiction. In Commonwealth countries the reason for 
this may be that errors of law can be quite easily corrected 
by more direct procedures, such as the case stated (in 
England an appeal on law) or by the power to review for 
error of law on the face of the award, considered further 
below. At the level of States however the procedure of 
bringing an award before a court is less well defined.
226 
The King of Spain case was a claim of nullity brought in the 
general (contentious) jurisdiction of the International 
Court. To make findings upon mistakes of law would 
necessarily involve characterising them as errors going to 
the root of the award so as to nullify it. 
226. J.L. Brierly The Law of Nations (Wald ock edn. Oxford, 1963) 350-351. 
C. Procedural Errors and Misconduct 
In virtually all systems of arbitration recourse to 
judicial authorities is permitted on the grounds of 
100 
procedural irregularities. This is justified, whether the 
arbitral process is seen as basically contractual, where the 
procedure is set down in the terms of the agreement or 
provided for less directly; or whether it is viewed as a 
judicial process, deciding the legal rights of persons 
according to the rules of fairness. On the other hand, the 
content of a fair and impartial procedure is generally left 
vague, so that precisely what constitutes procedural error 
may not be defined in advance. 
For example, in New Zealand the Arbitration Act 
provides for removal of the arbitrator or the quashing of 
his award for misconduct, either of the arbitrator, or of 
the proceedings. The word "misconduct 11227 itself is 
incapable of exact definition, and the courts tend to widen 
its meaning to include ''technical" or "legal" misconduct, 
that is, irregularities which do not involve improper 
motives. The New Zealand Act also furnishes a more specific 
example of procedural fault, in the section dealing with due 
d . t h 228 1spa c . Why this aspect should be dealt with 
separately is not entirely clear. In part, it may be that 
failure to "enter in" the reference does not amount to 
misconduct of "the proceedings", but given the extended 
meaning of misconduct, failure to proceed expeditiously 
during the hearing appears to fall squarely within it. And 
227. 1927 Amendment Act, s.12. The actual word is "misconducted", though cognate 
statutes use the noun, which arguably has more approbrious connotations than the verb. 
228. Ibid., s.8. 
the provision goes on to state that an arbitrator removed 
for tardiness "shall not be entitled to receive any 
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remuneration in respect of his services". This is somewhat 
draconian, in view of the possibility of arbitrators being 
ousted for more serious offences, such as fraud or 
prejudice; the court in such cases is powerless to deprive 
them of their fees. In fact, an arbitrator is entitled to a 
reasonable remuneration for his services which can be 
229 
enforced by the court. 
Because of the breadth of the term ''misconduct" as 
interpreted by the courts it is desirable to determine some 
principles on which the power will be used. This is also 
necessary because of the different remedies available, 
including remission, setting aside and removal. All of 
these are serious, especially the last, since it denies the 
parties the services of the person who they originally 
agreed should resolve their dispute. 
It is clear that bias by predetermination constitutes 
. d 230 m1scon uct. So too would corruption, as in accepting 
bribes, or collusion with one party, or fraud in the 
proceedings. Where, however, morally improper conduct is 
not alleged other irregularities will be sufficient. A 
leading case is London Export Corporation v Jubilee Coffee 
· 231 h th t t ·d d 1 f Roasting Co. were e con rac prov1 e an appea rom 
the award to the board of appeal of a trade association. 
229. 1908 Act, s.22. 
230. But the parties can agree that the arbitrator be someone ~"ho is closely connected 
with a party, and this agreement will be upheld to the extent that it does not detract 
from s.16 of the 1938 Amendment. That section is concerned -ith stays of proceedings and 
revocation of submissions, but it is thought that if the action .ould have been stayed, a 
later challenge for misconduct will not succeed on this ground. 
231. Supra nl9. 
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When the appeal was heard the umpire (whose decision was 
being appealed, though in a de novo hearing) was present and 
stayed behind when the parties retired. This was apparently 
the custom of the association, although the appellant had 
protested against it. Diplock J. whose decision was 
232 
affirmed on appeal ruled that misconduct had been 
established. He first defined the circumstances when 
non-opprobrious misconduct would exist. Primarily a breach 
of the agreed rules of procedure would entitle the applicant 
to the setting aside of the decision. If no such rules 
existed, they could be implied, and the principles of 
natural justice would guide the court in this exercise. 
Secondly, failing breach of the express or implied 
procedure, the award could be set aside for being made 
contrary to public policy - an example of this being 
violation of natural justice. But Diplock J. went on to say 
that if there was an express term permitting the procedure 
attacked, the court "will not set aside the award except on 
grounds of public policy, which may include violation of the 
rules of natural justice ... " 
So in each case the principles of natural justice are 
implied - in the first case, where the contract provides for 
the situation, as a minimum standard; in the second case, 
to fill the gaps in the procedure. Yet his Lordship further 
indicated that the parties were entitled, if they so wished, 
to expressly adopt a procedure that was unreasonable. But 
it may be queried whether a clause dispensing with natural 
justice would not be held to be unreasonable. So it is 
23 2. Ibid, 661, C.A. 
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unclear whether such a clause would be allowed to stand. 
The question was not resolved in the case itself, since the 
practice in question - the alleged trade custom - was held 
neither to be contrary to natural justice nor, however, to 
be permitted by the parties agreement. For the latter 
reason misconduct had been made out. 
But in another case where in the course of lengthy 
proceedings the arbitrator asked the parties to invite him 
to give an interim award, to which they agreed, and also to 
undertake that neither would apply to the court on the 
ground of misconduct for irregular procedure, it was held 
that the parties could by agreement dispense with the 
. t f l . . 233 requiremen so natura Justice. 
By way of comment, it might be noted that in 
administrative law the principles of natural justice vary in 
their content depending on the circumstances of the 
234 case. It would appear that an even more flexible 
approach should be taken vis-a-vis arbitral tribunals, for 
two reasons. In the first place their procedure is 
typically less clearly set out and less standard. An 
administrative body is ordinarily constituted by an Act or 
regulations which also establish some procedural rules. The 
legislation is publicly available for consultation; the 
tribunal can be expected to build up a certain expertise in 
applying it. By contrast arbitral procedure, though 
233. Hughes v Ruthin Borough Council (1972) 22 2 E.G.163; [1972) C.L.Y.122, Aclcner J. 
234. See e.g. Daganayasi v Minister of I=i gration [1980) 2 N.Z.L.R. 130, 141; Wiseman v 
Borneman [1971) A.C.297, 308. 
basically similar, can vary in detail from case to case. 
Unless he operates under an institution's rules an 
arbitrator will not necessarily be familiar with these 
details; often he will be neither a lawyer nor a 
professional arbitrator. 
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The second, more fundamental reason goes to the 
parties' autonomy. Arguably they should be able to contract 
out of the rules of natural justice altogether if they so 
wish. The general trend of cases shows that this course is 
not approved by the judges and in many instances there are 
sound reasons for such an attitude. For instance, the 
protection of the weaker party is sometimes cited as a 
reason for both imposing and policing standards. But there 
is still room to argue that the required procedure should be 
less exacting, whether set out expressly in the contract or 
implied as a matter of law. Flexibility and informality 
are, it may be assumed, part of the reasons for attracting 
parties to arbitration in the first place. 
Related to the possibility of opting out of natural 
justice is the question of waiver of procedural faults after 
they have occurred. In principle acquiescence in such 
defects with knowledge of them can operate to preclude a 
235 challenge to the award. The waiver can be express or 
implied though what constitutes an implied waiver may give 
rise to some difficult questions. The aggrieved party might 
well want to continue with the proceedings; the safest 
course would then be to make it clear that this is without 
prejudice to raising the procedural objection later. 
There are different ways of attempting to ensure that 
too-rigid standards contrary to the parties intention are 
105 
not applied. The criteria for intervention can be left up 
to the court to decide; this is the position under the 
Arbitration Act where ''misconduct" is the standard, a term 
sufficiently broad to grant a wide discretion to the judge 
not to intervene. But of course a broad power can be used 
to the opposite effect also. Alternatively specific grounds 
could be established, and interference confined strictly to 
these. In addition, the power to review for procedural 
error might be exercisable only if a party's rights have 
been prejudiced thereby. Or a clear distinction might be 
made in the statute between mandatory and directory rules. 
Further, a time limit could be imposed on applications for 
. 236 review. 
A final point of interest concerns the relationship of 
misconduct to errors of law rather than of procedure.Russell 
on Arbitration states that "[i]t is not misconduct on the 
part of an arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision, 
whether his error is one of fact or law ... ". But some of 
the cases are less categorical. For example in Re Jones and 
I b' ' 237 d' . b't t' Carters Ar itration an Act irecting ar i ra ion on 
certain disputes provided that the High Court's powers in 
cases of misconduct should be exercised by a County Court. 
The English Court of Appeal said that although in most cases 
the High Court's jurisdiction to quash for error on the face 
was preserved, where the error was in the nature of 
misconduct the County Court alone had jurisdiction. 
New Zealand High 
236. Cf. the American legislation, Part II E supra. 
237. [1922)2 Ch.599. 
Several 
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Court cases assimilate the two concepts. In F.M.I.A. v 
Parsons
238 
the court rejected an argument that mistake of 
law could not be misconduct. Other decisions are less 
explicit but clearly proceed on the basis that error of law 
. . 239 can constitute misconduct. 
These cases are probably explicable on the basis that 
the court, in reading the statute literally, thought that 
power to set aside was confined to misdonduct. And since 
counsel had cited authorities where errors of law had been 
reviewed, the judges did not distinguish between the two 
concepts. 
While the same results would have been reached on 
either analysis, the apparent confusion highlights the 
problems of parallel statutory and inherent jurisdictions, 
and of the inappropriate terminology used in the Act. 
D. Errors of Law 
It appears that in most legal systems an error made by 
an arbitration properly appointed and proceeding fairly will 
not be reviewed by a court. The fundamental reason for this 
is that the parties have delegated the power of decision to 
their chosen judge and they must accept his award for good 
or ill, provided that he has not exceeded his powers or 
abused his procedure. This proposition is of course subject 
to statutory incursion, but by and large legistatures do not 
provide for review of simple errors either of fact or law. 
The finality of the arbitrator's decision on those matters 
is inherent in the process, and to allow wide-ranging review 
would defeat the aims of arbitration. 
238. (1970] N.Z.L.R. 799, 800 
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But New Zealand law, in company with most other common 
law countries, provides for scrutiny of awards for errors of 
law, and possibly of fact, where the error appears on the 
face of the record. This power survives from the rules of 
1 d . 241 common aw an equity. It is said to be an anomalous 
extension of the principle that an award which does not 
comply with the formal requirements of a valid award is bad 
and Wi·11 be set asi·ae. 242 I H d k" F · 243 th n o g inson v ernie e 
question of damages in an action was referred to 
arbitration, and the award later challenged for error of 
law. However there was nothing on the face to show the 
error and therefore the Court of Common Plea9 rejected the 
claim. Williams J. said that the only exceptions to the 
rule that the award is binding were corruption, fraud "and 
one other, which, though it is to be regretted, is now, I 
think, firmly established, viz where the question of law 
necessarily arises on the face of the award, or upon some 
paper accompanying and forming part of the award. 244 
Despite similar expressions of regret, the jurisdiction has 
b . k d . . th 245 een invo e many times since en. 
However certain limitations on the power must be 
observed. First of all, the error must be on the face of 
the award. Thus if the arbitrator gives no reasons and the 
240, Russell, supra, n.15, 274 et seq. 
241. W Holdsworth A History of English Law (Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1964) 
vol.14, 201. 
242. Russell, supra n.15, 437. 
243. (1857)3 C.B. (N.S.) 189; 140 E.R.71 2, 
244, I bi d, 202; 717. 
245. E.g. British Westinghouse & Co. Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co. of London 
[1912] A.C.673; Wellington City Council v National Bank of N.Z. Properties Ltd, [1970] 
t-/.Z.L.R.660, 
dispositive section of the award is in order, there is no 
power to review. The practice arose in England for most 
commercial arbitrators to give no reasons for their 
decisions, or if they did, to deliver them at a separate 
time, sometimes expressly stating that they were not 
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intended to be part of the award. Further the parties might 
have to undertake not to use the reasons in any challenge to 
the award. 246 
But where there is a note of the reasons delivered 
with the award, the question is whether they form part of 
its "face" so as to allow review. Various factors are 
relevant: whether the reasons are physically attached to 
the award, whether they are delivered at the same time, 
whether they are referred to in the formal award itself. 
Moreover if the dispute is on a contract and the contractis 
"incorporated" in and of the above ways, it too can be 
looked at to see if the award has misconstrued it. The 
1 1 · · · h . 1 24 7 d 1' t rues re ating to incorporation are tee nica an , 
is submitted, not calculated to produce results consistent 
with parties' expectations. 
An interesting contrast may be made with 
administrative law where decisions can also be reviewed for 
error on the face. There a quite liberal approach is 
adopted to what constitutes the record. For instance it 
includes any document referred to in the primary documents; 
. f 1 d . . 248 it can even include the transcript o an ora ecision. 
246. Commercial Court Committee, supra n.28, para.6 
247. See 2 Halsburv's Laws (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1973) para. 623, n.6. 
248. ~- v Knightsbridge Crown Court, Exp. International Sporting Club [1982) Q.B.304, 
316. See generally H.W.R. Wade Administrative Law (5 ed, O.U.P.,1982) 280-281. 
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In arbitration, on the other hand, what is comprised 
in "the record" is viewed more restrictively. In Max Cooper 
249 
& Sons Pty. Ltd v University of New South Wales the 
plaintiff entered a building contract with the university . 
. 
In an arbitration between the two parties a question of law 
arose and was referred by special case to the Supreme Court. 
The court gave its opinion in favour of the university, but 
the Court of Appeal overturned this result, opining in 
favour of the builder. The case being remitted to the 
arbitrators, they found for the builder. Their award 
recited the question of law and the fact that the Court of 
Appeal's opinion was for the builder on that question. The 
university then applied to the Supreme Court to set the 
award aside. The judge held that the opinion (including the 
reasons) of the Court of Appeal did form part of the record, 
but that he was bound by the opinion. 
appealed to the Privy Council. 
The university 
The claim was unmeritorious in that the appellants 
were seeking to upset the opinion on case stated of the 
Court of Appeal, where no appeal lay directly from that 
decision - in effect to review the decision of a superior 
court of law. 250 The Judicial Committee (through Lord 
Diplock) also noted that the power the university was 
seeking to invoke was historically anomalous and had been 
abolished in England. Further, that it was a discretion 
"which the court has no jurisdiction to refuse to 
. ,. 251 
exercise. 
249. [1979) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 257 
250. Review of such a court by the direct route of prerogative orders is impermissible at 
common law: Re Racal Communications Ltd. [1981) A.C.374. 
251. Supra n.249, 261. But the error must be material: ibid,262. 
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The Privy Council held that since the reviewability of 
the award depended on whether or not the error was 
incorporated, which was an artificial distinction, the court 
should lean in favour of a construction of the award which 
did not express the arbitrators' reasoning to attack. " [T]o 
make it vulnerable, what the error is must appear upon its 
face as a matter of actual exposition, not one of inference 
1 II 252 on y. The issue was an ordinary question of 
construction, where the test was the intention of the 
draftsman - and the arbitrator "can be presumed to know the 
vulnerability with which the award will be infected if he 
incorporates as part of it the legal reasoning or which it 
is based". 
An Australian case253 in which the court's opinion 
on case stated was held to be part of the award was 
distinguished on the ground that there the award had openly 
stated it was following the opinion. In the instant 
situation the award merely recited the fact of the 
consultative opinion being obtained - the arbitrators might 
not have followed it (this is with respect a very fine 
distinction). 
Applying these principles, the award was found to lack 
any statement of grounds or incorporated document disclosing 
an error; the appeal was dismissed. 
The decision is clearly based on a policy of finality 
in arbitral awards. In this respect the reference to the 
English Act of 1979 is noteworthy; have the basic 
legislative changes brought about in England eppeared by 
252. Idem. 
253. Tota Products Pty. Ltd v Hutcherson Bros. Ptv . Ltd (1972) 127 C.L.R.253. 
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some osmotic influence in the common law of New South Wales? 
One New Zealand judge has doubted the legitimacy of the 
method but held that he was bound by the plain intention of 
th P . · 1 254 e rivy Counc1 . Viewed in terms of this basic 
policy (which Lord Diplock expressly outlined) the judgment 
is unlikely to have much significance in administrative law 
255 for the definition of "the face of the record". But in 
the field of arbitration it is not without its difficulties 
of implementation. The majority of the New Zealand Court of 
256 257 Appeal recently distinguished Max Cooper in a case 
where the award was contained in a booklet along with the 
"reasons for award". Max Cooper, on the other hand, was a 
case of alleged incorporation by reference, though the dicta 
are more widely stated - the Privy Council said that an 
arbitrator could avoid incorporation by putting down his 
reasons on a different sheet of paper which "he makes it 
unequivocally clear" is not intended to form part of his 
award. The Court of Appeal said that this phrase suggested 
a disclaimer was an important factor. The absence of such a 
disavowal, (especially when one arbitrator was a Q.C.) 
coupled with the "physical and verbal unity" of award and 
reasons led to the conclusion that the reasons were intended 
to be part of the decision. 
The upshot seems to be that while the intention of the 
arbitrator is the overall test, there is a distinction 
254. Thorp J. in Kenneth Williams, supra n.98, 605 
255. The dictum of Thorp J. to this effect, it is submitted, is correct. 
256. Including Si r Clifford Richmond, a member of the Judicial Committee in Max Cooper. 
25 7. Manukau Ci tv Council v Fletcher Mainline Ltd. [1982]2 N.Z.L.R. 142. 
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between the "one document" cases (Max Cooper) and other 
situations. In the former the court will lean strongly 
against incorporation, unless the arbitrator's intention is 
clearly to the contrary. In the latter all the relevant 
circumstances, including physical annexation and "verbal 
unity" (which the Privy Council thought entirely neutral) 
.d d 258 are consi ere. 
The second limitation on the power to review for 
mistake of law on the face of the award is where a question 
of law has been specifically referred. In such a case the 
court will uphold the parties' wish that the arbiter finally 
d ·d h 1 1 · 
259 
eci et e ega issues. But a question has not been 
specifically referred if it arises in the course of 
determining the dispute. Often exactly what has been 
referred and whether it is a question of law arouses much 
difficulty. Moreover the distinction between a specific 
reference of a question of law and other references can be 
criticised. It may be purely fortuitous that the reference 
is phrased as a specific legal question. And why should 
reviewability depend on the distinction; it implies a prima 
facie obstacle to the disputants' submitting the questions 
of their choice to the final adjudication of a judge of 
their choice. 
A brief comparison with the American position reveals 
a quite different approach. It was held from an early date 
that so long as the award was within the submission, was 
given as the honest and impartial decision of the 
258. See also Gold Coast Citv Council v Canterbury Pipe Lines (Aust). Ptv. Ltd (1968)118 
C.L.R.58; Pearl Marin v Pietro Cingolani (The General Valdes) [1982)1 Lloyd's Rep.17, 
C.A. 
259. F.R. Absalom, supra n. 72; Att-Gen . v Offshore Mining, supra n.119. 
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arbitrators and after and full and fair hearing it woild not 
be set aside for error of law or fact. 260 The statutory 
grounds for vacating an award under the U.S. Arbitration Act 
were outlined above. Error of law was not among them. But 
judge-made law has created the doctrine of "manifest 
disregard of law", interpreting the excess of jurisdiction 
d . h · 1k 261 groun in t e Act. In Wi o v Swann a customer of a 
brokerage firm alleged a violation by the firm of the 
Federal Securities Act 1933. The plaintiff's contract with 
the firm stipulated that disputes should be arbitrated. The 
Supreme Court held that the arbitration could not be 
specifically enforced, 262 since the special remedies 
afforded by the Securities Act could not be waived. It 
further acknowledged that if the arbitration went ahead and 
was decided in manifest disregard of the law the award could 
be vacated. However the breach would have to be clear - the 
arbitrator's interpretation of the law, even if erroneous, 
was unreviewable unless it amounted to "manifest disregard". 
Another case put it even more strongly263 - that 
manifest disregard existed only where the arbitrator 
understood the law correctly but proceeded to disregard it. 
And a later decision upheld an award, although it was 
described by one judge as incorrect, baseless and 
. . l 264 1rrat1ona . 
260. Burchell v Marsh 58 U.S.344 (1854) 
261. 346 U.S.427 (1953) 
262. The decision on this point was distinguished in Scherk v Alberto-Culver, supra, 
n.44. 
263. San Martine v Saguenay Terminals Ltd 293 F.2d.796 (1961) C.A.th Circ. 
264. I/S Staborg v National Metal Converters 500 F.2d.424 (1974) C.A. 2nd Circ. 
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E. Errors of Fact 
If both mistakes of law and of fact are reviewable, 
what is the advantage of arbitration at all? A judge would 
have final jurisdiction on both aspects of the proceedings, 
much as he does from inferior courts. Nevertheless it is at 
least arguable that errors of fact on the face of the award 
are susceptible of review in this country. 
It is necessary to distinguish between mistakes 
admitted by the arbitrator and unacknowledged alleged 
errors. In the first of these cases the award will 
generally be remitted to the arbitrator for correction; or 
it might be set aside though Russell doubts this.
265 
Where the mistake is not admitted the position is 
dubious. The statutory power to set aside for misconduct is 
inapplicable since mistake does not amount to 
misconduct.
266 Is there a common law power to set aside 
for mistake of fact? The United Kingdom Parliament appears 
to have assumed so in enacting the Arbitration Act 1979, 
section 1 of which reads in part: 
"[T]he High Court shall not have jurisdiction to set 
aside or remit an award ... on the ground of errors 
of fact or law on the face of the award." 
In Moran v Lloyd 1 s
267 the Court of Appeal assumed 
that the emphasised words were not otiose. If that is so 
then review for errors of fact theoretically exists in New 
265. Supra. n.15, 456. 
266. But see supra. 
267. [1983)2 W.L.R.672. 
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Zealand and other common law jurisdictions. However, 
Russell records no satisfactory examples of the power being 
. k d 268 d h . . 1nvo e , an t ere 1s good reason to restrict the 
common law power, admittedly anomalous, to mistakes of law. 
F. Control at Enforcement Stage 
Section 13 of the Act provides for leave to be given 
to enforce. On what principles will leave be granted, there 
being no statutory indications? The courts, at least until 
recently, have been somewhat grudging in the use of this 
section. Their attitude was governed for a long time by a 
d . t f S J . k 269 h h 1c um o crutton L .. 1n Re Bos & Co, were t e 
losing party in the arbitration resisted enforcement on the 
ground that the original contract had been illegal. The 
Court of Appeal declined to grant leave to enforce, and 
Scrutton L.J. said: 
"[T]his summary method of enforcing awards is only to 
be used in reasonably clear cases. It is not intended 
on the application for leave to enforce an award to 
try a complicated or disputed or difficult question of 
law. If it is not reasonably clear that the award 
should be enforced, the party seeking to enforce it 
must be left to his remedy by action ... " 
It is worth remembering that if in fact the transaction was 
illegal (for lack of a statutory licence to trade in the 
particular product) then the whole contract and arbitration 
clause would have been void. Indeed this was presumably the 
basis on which an earlier application to set the award aside 
was refused: there was no valid submission and thus no 
268. Supra n.25, supplement to p.447. 
269. [1919]1 K.B.491. 
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no award to be quashed. 270 Thus doubts as to the validity 
of the award were ones going to its very existence. 
The case has been followed in New Zealand in 
Mackintosh v Castle Land Co.
271 which involved an 
arbitration of disputes concerning a lease. The defendant 
objected to leave being given because it alleged that the 
award was bad on its face for not having dealt with all the 
points submitted. The judge said: 
"I think there can be little doubt that if an award is 
or may be uncertain or in some other way defective on 
its face then the present procedure is not 
appropriate." 
However leave to enforce was granted. 
A more recent decision of the English Court of Appeal 
is in conflict with these cases. The court in Middlemiss v 
H tl 1 C · 
272 t d 1 t f h ar epoo orporat1on gran e eave o en orce were 
the loser in the arbitration objected, inter alia, that the 
award contained an error of law. Lord Denning M.R. 
disapproved the Re Boks dictum, saying that: 
"Scrutton L.J. went a good deal too far. He said ... 
"[the summary enforcement method] is only to be used 
in reasonably clear cases". I would put it just the 
opposite. I would say it is to be used in nearly all 
cases. Leave should be given to enforce the award as 
a judgment unless there is real ground for doubting 
the validity of the award." 
Lord Denning's approach also differed from the 
Mackintosh case in another important respect. In neither 
case had the objector sought to set aside the award, either 
270. Ibid., 493. Though logically correct this point has given rise to obvious 
inconvenience and the procedure for challenging has been amended: see Russell, supra 
n.25, 423. 
271. Supra n.222 
272. [1972]1 W.L.R. 1643 (decided after MacKintosh) . 
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in separate proceedings or at the same time as leave to 
enforce was applied for. The New Zealand court held that 
this did not preclude the claim of invalidity being argued. 
Inactivity could not "render valid an award which was 
. 1·d . f "273 inva i on its ace . If "invalidity" is intended to 
cover all errors on the face then the dictum appears to be 
too wide. The English Court of Appeal decided that, at 
least where the objection was one of error of law not 
amounting to illegality or some other form of nullity, the 
point should have been brought up on a case stated, as the 
award had been made in that form. The court did not mention 
the possibility of review for error on the face, but it is 
reasonable to suppose that, had that been the method of 
challenge, it too would not have been entertained. An award 
in the form of a case stated is by definition made before 
the arbitrator is functus officio; respondents would have 
even more time to consider applying under the inherent 
jurisdiction, since that can only be done after the award is 
delivered. 
Thus if the Court of Appeal's attitude is followed in 
this country an application for leave to enforce will be 
granted unless there is a substantial doubt as to the 
validity of the award. The court did not in terms say that 
the doubt must go to the very existence of the award - that 
is, to resist it the award must be not merely challengeable 
but null - but this proposition is consistent with the case 
and with the Re Boks decision, and also with the facts 
though not the dicta in Mackintosh. 
273. Supra n.222, 197. 
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At this point there may be noted an interesting contrast 
between arbitrators and other types of tribunals. Where an 
administrative tribunal has acted in breach of the rules of 
natural justice its decision is usually said to be a 
11 . 274 nu 1ty. Breach of these rules ought logically to 
amount to grounds for resisting enforcement. But in 
Thorburn v Barnes275 Willes J. said: 
"If an arbitrator stood in the same position as an 
ordinary judge, the argument would be conclusive. But 
he does not ... Insufficiency or want of hearing must 
be urged as a ground for setting aside the award on 
motion, and cannot be set up as a bar to an action 
upon it." 
This was evidently an action at common law before the 
Arbitration Act was passed, but the principle has been 
276 applied to applications for leave under the Act. Thus 
breach of natural justice does not, in arbitration, mean 
277 there is no decision, merely an improper one; and a 
motion to set aside is necessary. 
If the award sought to be enforced in New Zealand was 
made overseas the grounds for refusal of execution are more 
clearly specified. Under the legislation ratifying the New 
York Convention the award "shall not be enforceable if 
the person against whom it is sought to enforce it11278 
proves one of a number of possibilities. These grounds, 
which paraphrase the text of the Convention in effect are: 
(1) incapacity of a party to the agreement when it 
was made 
274. E.g. Ridge v Baldwin [1964] A.C.40. 
275. (1867) L.R.2 C.P. 384, 402. 
276. E.g. Benedetti v Sasvary [1967] 2 N.S.W.R.792. 
277. Bache v Billingham [1894]1 Q.B.107. 
278. Supra n.111, 1982 Act, ss.5-7 "Enforcing" includes reference to "relying on" an 
award. 
(2) invalidity of the agreement under the law 
governing it 
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(3) failure to notify the parties o~79he hearing or to allow a case to be presented 
(4) where the award is made on a matter not submitted 
(though it is no basis for refusing enforcement 
that the a~§od fails to deal with all questions 
submitted) 
(5) improper constitution or procedure of the 
tribunal according to the parties' agreement (or 
failing such agreement, the law of the seat of 
arbitration). 
(6) the award is not yet binding on the parties, or 
has been set aside in the country of origin. 
Furthermore the court "may" refuse enforcement: 
(7) if ~§I matter is non-arbitrable under New Zealand 
law 
(8) if enforcement is contrary to public policy. 
Finally, while under both the Convention and the 
implementing Act there is a general obligation to enforce 
subject to the above exceptions, a slight difference between 
the texts is of interest. Under the New Zealand 
legislation, in a case where one of grounds (1) to (6) above 
is made out the award "shall" not be enforceable. Article V 
of the Convention is less restrictive: 
279. Cf. nn274-277 and text, supra. 
280. Cf. the 1933 Act, supra n.11, s.6(2)(c). Under the 1982 Act if a matter not 
referred is dealt with but can be severed from the rest of the award the latter can be 
enforced: s.7(4). 
281. See e.g. n.7 supra (arbitration clauses in insurance policies unenforceable against 
policy-holder - though not unlawful per se). 
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282 
Recognition and enforcement of the award may 
be refused ... only [if one of the grounds is 
established]." 
Thus, under the Convention, awards could theoretically 
be enforced even though one of the grounds has been 
in New Zealand this is not possible. To take established; 
an example: if an award rendered in Australia has been 
annulled by an Australian court it is "not enforceable" 
under the New Zealand legislation. Under the terms of the 
Convention itself, however, there would still be room for a 
court in which execution was sought to enforce it. Although 
this is unlikelyto occur, it is possible that if the 
annulment was capricious, or if the nullifying court was 
acting ultra vires, then enforcement might yet be granted. 
It is noteworthy that the corresponding United Kingdom 
legislation is so framed as to leave this discretion with 
the court. 283 
282. Cf. the French text 330 U.N.T .S. 39, 41: ''la reconnaissance et l'ex~cution •.•• ne 
seront refusees ••. que si ... " which is therefore to the same effect. 
283. Supra n.192, s.5(2) 
VI. 
A. 
CONCLUSION 
General 
This paper has considered the relationship of 
arbitration to ordinary courts of law. Arbitration is a 
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process which can be viewed in at least two ways: as an 
essentially contractual arrangement between two individuals 
to effect a resolution of their dispute; or as a judicial 
procedure subject to the basic requirements of the judicial 
process and to an overall supervision by the courts. 
Different aspects of these models are emphasised at various 
times and in different arenas. In all municipal 
jurisdictions legislatures regulate the arbitral process by 
subjecting it to rules and by granting the courts the power 
to enforce them. The extent of the control has been seen to 
vary markedly between different systems. 
The perception of the process is also subject to 
change within a single system, as the recent legislative and 
judicial developments in England show. 
It is worthwhile to recall some of the interests which 
are present in the arbitral - judicial relationship. A 
clear and strong factor is the freedom of the parties to 
contract, which entails also the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. Arbitration is only possible (the special 
question of statutory or compulsory "arbitrations'' aside) 
where a conscious decision is made to have recourse to it. 
Courts are generally willing to uphold the freedom to 
contract and the obligations erected by agreement. But the 
treatment of arbitration agreements and awards by courts 
also reflects competing interests, such as the maintenance 
of the rule of law. This leads, it is said , to the 
consequence that legal standards must be upheld in 
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arbitration awards while arbitral proceedings must comply 
with substantially the same basic rules of procedure as 
courts follow. Another interest in need of protection is 
that of the weaker party - this is recognised in a general 
way by the statutory powers granted the courts to control 
the process and occasionally in a specific context by 
legislative evisceration of arbitration clauses. The courts 
adopt a similar attitude - the protection of the 
commercially weak is a strong underlying factor of the 
principle enunciated in Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & 
Co .. 
284 
The same idea can also be seen in traditional 
contractual terms: where there is no consent freely given 
the sanctity of contract is inapplicable. Finally the 
interest of the legal system in practice is important - this 
also cuts both ways. The use of arbitration brings benefits 
by saving the courts time and effort, and the taxpayers 
money. But it is also important that dispute settlement 
within arbitration be relatively efficient, and the courts 
and legislature have had to intervene to ensure this. 
In public international law these interests are in the 
main applicable, but sometimes in modified form; there are 
other more complicated ones present too. For example it may 
be harder to define what is a legal question suitable for 
arbitral (or even judicial) decision. And though the rule 
of law is important at the level of relations between 
states, the principles of contract are even more important 
than in municipal systems. This is because organisation on 
the international plane necessarily takes the form of 
284. Supra n.26. 
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consensual agreement much more than of imposed determination 
of rights and obligations. The issue of reality of consent 
is nevertheless still relevant in international relations. 
At this level also, procedural and legal rules are 
important. Admittedly their sources are different - they 
are contractual rather than laid down by a central 
authority. And it has been doubted that rules which are too 
refined and too often applicable, whatever the nature of the 
285 dispute, are acceptable to states. The fate of the 
International Law Commission's draft rules of arbitral 
d . 1 f h. 286 proce ure is an examp e o t is. Nevertheless a more 
optimistic outlook is possible in relation to the use of 
arbitral procedures in individually negotiated agreements 
287 with a more limited scope than the I.L.C. draft. At 
the same time there is some evidence of more flexible 
"arbitration-like" procedures being adopted by international 
· d. · 1 b d. 288 h. h · d. · · JU icia o ies , w ic may in icate an increasing 
acceptance. 
The methods of intervention of the arbitral process 
are an important aspect of the relationship governing the 
interests involved. Self-regulation, as noted, plays a 
potentially important role in international law - with a 
possible development into transnational law and the evolving 
"delocalisation" phenomenon. In the domestic law 
285. See e.g. C. de Visscher, supra n.5. 
286. Supra. n.22 
287. L.B. Sohn "The Role of Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral Treaties" 
(1983)23 Va.J.I.L.171. 
288. Special chambers of the International Court of Justice can now be selected by 
litigants to hear their case - e.g. the Gulf of Maine case: see (1981) 20 I.L.M.1371. 
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of countries like New Zealand its function is more limited, 
in part perhaps because regulation is presently performed by 
courts. In terms of the contractual nature of arbitration 
the intervention in the process is sometimes said not to be 
justifiable - the parties having agreed to their contract 
should be held to it, even at the expense of errors of law. 
The American position approximates more closely to this 
attitude than do other English-derived systems. But as the 
paper has emphasised intervention takes several forms. The 
court may be asked to preclude the arbitration, or to compel 
it. It might be called on to support the proceedings by 
appointing an arbitrator, or by using its coercive powers to 
compel attendance, or production of evidence, or inspection 
of property. On the other hand it might control the 
reference by revoking the arbitrator's authority or setting 
aside the award. In some circumstances the court can 
decline to enforce an award even after the whole process has 
been completed. But if it does not, then the power of the 
state can be employed to enforce the decision whereas by 
itself might be practically meaningless. 
At a certain level these methods can be seen as 
merging into one: the court is enforcing the parties true 
understanding. For instance by preventing the arbitration 
where there is no dispute, in effect the court is enforcing 
the true relationship between the disputants - no legal 
obligation has yet arisen which compels them to go to 
arbitration. Or by summoning witnesses the court can be 
regarded as assisting the effective resolution of the 
dispute in the manner selected by the parties. This 
analysis can not however be extended too far, unless the 
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parties are free to specifically exclude the powers granted 
the court by statute. As has been seen, in New Zealand they 
are not able to do so. Moreover the analysis depends on the 
assumption that disputants intend that their differences be 
resolved according to law. It is submitted that this is not 
always the case; the obligation of the arbitrator to come 
to a correct legal decision arises by operation of law, and 
is not always, perhaps not even usually, matched by the 
intention of the parties. 
B. THE ACT 
The main focus of this paper has not been to consider 
the difficulties the Arbitration Act 1908; several law 
reform bodies have performed this task on equivalent 
statutes.
289 Rather the Act has been discussed in terms 
of its relationship with the general law and the 
arbitrator's powers and duties. But it is appropriate to 
mention some of the issues raised and comment on them. 
The scope of the legislation in relation to all 
arbitrations is unclear. Some provisions are clearly 
optional and their effect can be defeated by a contrary 
intention. Some sections have been held to apply despite an 
agreement to exclude them. Others are unclear. It would be 
preferable to state clearly, as does the legislation of a 
f · · d. · 
290 h. h d d h. h ew Juris 1ct1ons, w 1c are man atory an w 1c are 
defeasible. 
To do so does of course require decisions as to which 
sections should be able to be excluded, and on what 
conditions. The English Act of 1979 raises these questions; 
289. E.g. W. Aust. Law Reform Commission Report on Commercial Arbitration and Commercial 
Clauses (No. 18,1974); N.S.W. Law Reform Commission Report on Commercial Arbitration 
(L.R.C.27, 1976) 
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several New Zealand judges have suggested considering the 
enactment of a similar amendment in this country, if only to 
revive "the direct influence and relevance of the English 
case law. [This course] would also avoid the complexities 
which appear to me to be involved in the implementation of 
the Max Cooper decision 
II 291 But it is questionable 
whether the overall postiion would be ameliorated by 
b . . h 1 . . f h 
292 
su stituting t e comp ex1t1es o Te Nema case. The 
English Act abolishes the case stated and replaces it with a 
system of appeals on points of law, for which leave must be 
sought. It further permits, in certain circumstances, the 
direct exclusion by agreement of the right of appeal. An 
alternative approach would be to restrict the grounds of 
review of an award, which would limit rather than expand the 
judge's discretion. Such a system has the merit of 
specifying clearly in advance the reasons for upsetting an 
award; in contrast the principles laid down in The Nema, it 
is suggested, are neither clear nor always capable of 
reasonably easy application. Moroever they are 
strictly speaking obiter dicta, albeit from a senior Law 
Lord. The system of enacting a number grounds of invalidity 
could change the existing law in this country by abolishing 
the jurisdiction to review for error on the face of the 
award. This power has almost from its inception been 
recognised as anomalous; it involves drawing sometimes 
casuistic distinctions between specific and non-specific 
references, and as to what constitutes the "face'' of the 
award. And confusion between errors of law and misconduct 
291. Kenneth Williams v Martelli, supra n.98, 605. 
292. Supra n.90. 
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sometimes occurs. It would be open for Parliament to enact 
that error of law can continue to be a ground of review, but 
considerable thought should be given before taking this 
step. The principles of the rule of law and of freedom of 
contract need to be weighed up. Possibly such a right of 
review could be hedged with qualifications, such as giving a 
right to exclude it (before or after a dispute has arisen), 
or creating a particular standard of gravity before the 
award can be invalidated - though this plainly invites its 
own problems. In any case limitations on the period in 
which a challenge can be made would contribute to the speed 
of the arbitral process. 
Any system defining invalidating irregularities should 
reconsider the power to review for "misconduct''. The term 
is now inappropriate to describe all procedural mistakes. 
Most systems of law provide for upsetting an award where the 
procedure has been defective in some respect. There are, 
however, degrees of irregularity, perhaps here even more so 
than in the case of error of law. Not all procedural faults 
will at present lead to invalidation, but it is submitted 
that clearer indications in the statute of the types of 
vitiating defect would help. They would remove the need for 
references to "technical" and "legal" misconduct. 
Any opportunity taken to review the statute needs to 
be preceded by careful consideration of the nature of the 
arbitral process and its relationship to the rest of the 
legal system. Deeply ingrained beliefs about the rule of 
law suggest that arbitration ought to be regarded as another 
method of dispute resolution within the system and amenable 
128 
to the jurisdiction of the courts. Neverth ~less the concept 
of the rule of law does not prevent some St ?tes from giving 
a freer hand to individual parties, at lea s~ where they 
compete on fairly equal terms, to have the d isputes settled 
largely detached from the ordinary processes of the courts. 
--00000--
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
• ' "I ,_, 1·~·-:•. i ~ •• ,.; ... •,:'·.r<~· i i . ,., _ ,.,.,,:,~,~ , .. ·~-· .. ~~  ,-,_,., j""-'t • ·."1. .. ., .:.·; 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~ 3 7212 00442899 9 
r 
Folder 
Bu BULL, S.N.H. 
Due 
The arbitral process 
and the courts . 
444,123 
Borrower's Nome 

